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TAXING THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: WHY SECTION
501(C)(6) TRADE ASSOCIATIONS ARE UNDESERVING OF
TAX EXEMPTION
PHILIP T. HACKNEY†

ABSTRACT
The United States has long nourished a vibrant and extensive nonprofit sector. It accomplishes this in part by providing a subsidy through
exemptions from tax at the federal, state, and local levels. The subsidy is
provided to charitable organizations, social welfare organizations, labor
unions, business leagues, and many other nonprofit organizations. I argue
that we should end the subsidy for the nonprofit groups that represent
business interests. Some argue that we should subsidize nonprofit groups
that provide goods or services that would not otherwise be sufficiently
supplied by the market (market failure theory). Additionally some argue
that we subsidize to promote pluralism and a robust civic sector. Neither
theory supports the provision of this subsidy to business interests. There
is little evidence of market failure in this sector. Interest group literature
has long shown business interests dominate the interest group sector. We
can thus expect the subsidy to enhance that bias rather than reduce it.
Furthermore, because of significant collective action problems suffered
by large latent groups, the policy of subsidizing business interests likely
enhances the voice of the politically strong business interests, and devalues the voice of the politically weak. We should end or at the least weaken policies subsidizing business interests.
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2013 and 2014 Junior Tax Conference and the 2014 Tulane Tax Law Roundtable. Finally, a big
thanks to the LSU Law Center for a grant making this work possible. I especially thank my research
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this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.
1

—Adam Smith

The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings
with a strong upper-class accent.
2

—E.E. Schattschneider

1. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 232 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Classics
1999) (1776).
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Many were recently surprised and outraged when they found out
that the National Football League (NFL) is exempt from federal income
tax.3 While the NFL has indicated it now plans to switch to taxable status,4 it has long avoided paying income tax because it is considered a taxexempt business league just like a chamber of commerce or the American Bar Association (ABA).5 Barbers, or lawyers, or doctors, or football
team owners, to name some, can join forces as tax-exempt business
leagues, pool their money, invest their money, provide business services,
share information, and generally promote and lobby legislators regarding
their common business interest, all without owing any income tax.6
Many U.S. representatives and senators have recently called for the removal of this tax exemption for all sports leagues including the NFL.7
This Article agrees that ending the tax exemption of these sports-related
business leagues is a good idea; however, denying exemption to sports
business leagues does not go far enough. Business leagues as a category
fail to satisfy any theory justifying income tax exemption. Furthermore,
providing exemption to these organizations likely even causes some
harm. This Article calls for Congress to end tax exemption for these organizations.
In the nonprofit world, business leagues are considered mutualbenefit organizations because they work primarily to benefit the members of the organization, such as the aforementioned barbers, lawyers and
doctors. Tax exemption for mutual-benefit organizations such as busi2. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960).
3. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012). Congress added “professional football leagues” to the
statute in 1966. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–800, § 6(a), 80 Stat. 1508, 1515 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012)).
4. See Richard Rubin, NFL Will End Its Tax-Exempt Status, Goodell Tells Owners,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28, 2015 10:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-0428/nfl-will-end-its-tax-exempt-status-goodell-tells-team-owners.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) exempts from income tax “[b]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” § 501(c)(6).
6. Id. § 501(a).
7. Senator Coburn has introduced the PRO Sports Act, S. 1524, that excludes all professional
sports leagues from qualifying as tax-exempt organizations. PRO Sports Act, S. Res. 1524, 113th
Cong. (2013). Representative Dave Camp’s Tax Reform Act of 2014 called for the removal of
exemption for sports leagues in § 5301 of that proposal. DAVE CAMP, TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014
DISCUSSION
DRAFT
§
5301,
at
162
(2014),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_and_means_section_by_section_summary_final
_022614.pdf. Senators Maria Cantwell and Harry Reid introduced a bill that would pull the exemption of the NFL to put pressure on the NFL for maintaining the mascot name of the Washington
Redskins. S. 2884, 113th Cong. (2014); Press Release, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell, Cantwell, Reid,
Johnson Introduce Bill that Would Revoke NFL’s Tax-Exempt Status (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.cantwell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=0b70fa20-f382-484f-a343333e39b0ae57. Senator Cory Booker has also introduced legislation calling for the end of the NFL’s
exemption. Securing Assistance for Victims’ Empowerment (SAVE) Act, S. 2816, 113th Cong.
(2014). His proposal would send the tax paid to support domestic violence victims. Bernie Becker,
Senators Throw Hail Mary at NFL, THE HILL (Sept. 21, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/218398-senators-throw-hail-mary-at-nfl.

268

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:2

ness leagues is generally accepted to be the provision of a subsidy.8 The
subsidy for business leagues occurs because three forms of income are
not taxed: (1) investment income; (2) commercial income from the sale
of goods and services to members and nonmembers; and (3) member
income from member dues. Because much of the activities conducted by
business leagues would be deductible at some point, the subsidy is mostly a matter of tax deferral rather than full exemption.9 The subsidy likely
amounts to a relatively small amount compared to the tax system on the
whole. Nevertheless, it does establish an opportunity for a significant
sector of the business community to save in a tax-free manner to enhance
the opportunities of a business league’s members. Furthermore, federal
tax-exempt status is so often used as a signal for worthiness of other important subsidies and benefits such as state and local property tax exemption that getting tax exemption right at the federal level has many important spillover effects.10
Some argue we should subsidize nonprofits that provide goods or
services that would not otherwise be sufficiently supplied (market failure
theory).11 Additionally some argue that we should subsidize nonprofits to
promote pluralism and a robust civic sector (pluralism theory).12 This
Article argues that neither theory applies to support exemption for business leagues. It demonstrates that the goods and services supplied by
business leagues are generally not undersupplied. This undermines support for the market failure theory. Additionally, business interests suffer
relatively little collective action problems as compared to large, latent
interests, such as the poor. This undermines the support for the pluralism
theory. Interests that can never organize will never be able to access the
subsidy of tax exemption. Business interests, on the other hand, as will
8. See Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA.
TAX REV. 115, 151–52 (2013).
9. See Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 155–56
(2006).
10. BAZIL FACCHINA, EVAN SHOWELL & JAN E. STONE, TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY:
PRIVILEGES & EXEMPTIONS ENJOYED BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: A CATALOG AND SOME
THOUGHTS ON NONPROFIT POLICYMAKING 44–46 (1993) (cataloging some of the different rights
nonprofit organizations are entitled to beyond federal income tax exemption such as exemption from
state sales and property taxes). The state of Louisiana for instance provides exemption from ad
valorem taxation to business leagues under article 7, section 21 of its state Constitution. LA. CONST.
art. VII, § 21(B)(3). It provides the exemption to “a nonprofit corporation devoted to promoting
trade, travel, and commerce, and also property of a trade, business, industry or professional society
or association, if that property is owned by a nonprofit corporation or association organized under
the laws of this state for such purposes.” Id.
11. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67–68 (1981); see Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the
Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT
INSTITUTIONS 21, 22–24 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
12. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (describing the “role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often
sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints”); see also LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 14 (2d ed. 1999); John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in
AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT, at ix, xiii–xv (Brian O’Connell ed., 1983).
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be demonstrated in the Article, seem to have relatively easy access to this
subsidy. Thus, instead of promoting pluralism by promoting all diverse
interests that wish to organize and lobby government, the subsidy for
business interests enhances the voice of the politically strong and devalues the voice of the politically weak. Thus, the subsidy worsens pluralist
interests rather than enhancing them.
Although not particularly numerous (approximately 67,000 registered as tax-exempt in 2013),13 nor awash in national assets or revenue
($71 billion in total assets and $41 billion in total revenue in the sector in
2013),14 these organizations are often considered some of the most politically influential organizations in the country.15 Post Citizens United,16
many who closely observe our political system have called for new regulation of business leagues and social welfare organizations through the
Code focusing primarily on disclosure rules related to political campaign
activity.17 This Article adds to the tax legal literature on tax-exempt organizations by viewing them through the lens of interest-group literature.
13. Internal Revenue Service, Data Book, 2013, IRS PUBLICATION 55B, 56 tbl.25 (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13databk.pdf.
14. Number of Non-501(c)(3) Exempt Organizations in the United States, 2013, NAT’L CTR.
FOR
CHARITABLE
STATISTICS,
http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt=CO (last visited June 23,
2015) (information derived from the IRS Business Master File 10/2013).
15. Business leagues, such as the National Federation of Independent Business, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, and the American Association for Justice, regularly made up the majority of
the organizations listed in Fortune magazine’s Power 25, a list of the most influential lobbying
organizations on the federal level based on a polling of insiders. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL.,
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE 224 (2009). Fortune maintained the list from 1997 to 2001. Although the list is not based on any scientific principles in assessing actual influence, it does correlate
with amount of resources placed towards influencing national policy. Id. at 223–24. In the first
quarter of 2013, Roll Call published a list of the twenty-five largest lobbying spending firms—eight
of the twenty-five were comprised of business leagues, with the top three being business leagues.
Kent Cooper, Top 25 Organizations Lobbying in First Quarter, ROLL CALL (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:40
AM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/moneyline/top-25-organizations-lobbying-in-first-quarter/. Of the list
of the biggest lobbying spenders of 2013, OpenSecrets.org indicates that five business leagues were
included in the top ten. Organization Profiles, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/
(last visited June 23, 2015) (crediting the Center for Responsive Politics). The other five are business
corporations. Id.
16. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
17. The DISCLOSE Act of 2012 sponsored by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse would have
amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for additional disclosure from
corporations, labor unions, and other organizations when they make “independent expenditure[s]”
effectively advocating for a candidate. Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections Act of 2012, S. 3369, 112th (2d Sess. 2012); see also Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427,
440 (2011) (calling for disclosure of contributions to certain tax-exempt organizations for political
action on a rapid basis); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of
2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS 59, 92–93 (2010–2011) (calling for requiring tax-exempt organizations to
disclose substantial donors when such organizations advertise for political causes); Greg Colvin, A
Silver Bullet that Would End Secret Tax-Exempt Money in Elections, CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICA’S
FUTURE
(Apr.
11,
2012),
http://blog.ourfuture.org/20120411/A_Silver_Bullet_That_Would_End_Secret_TaxExempt_Money_in_Elections (proposing a cap on political intervention spending by any organization organized under § 501(c) of the lesser of $100,000 or 10% of expenditures).
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The primary contribution of this Article is to highlight the dominant purpose of these organizations, describe their activities, and demonstrate
why they do not fit well into the tax exemption rubric.
There are many interest groups in addition to business leagues including for-profit corporations and other tax-exempt organizations, such
as labor unions18 and social welfare organizations.19 This Article focuses
on business leagues in an attempt to get a greater understanding of the
interest group role played by one small facet of the exempt organization
sector. There is a dearth of scholarly legal literature on social welfare
organizations, labor unions, and business leagues as part of the nonprofit
sector or part of the tax-exempt sector. Given the challenges the IRS has
lately faced in regulating this sector,20 it seems an opportune time to
begin a careful examination of the roles of these important organizations
to our society.
Legal scholars who examine the role of interest groups often examine ways to justify the regulation of lobbying21 or the limits on campaign
finance spending.22 They view these intrusions of money into the political process as harmful to the country because of either corruption or
harm to national economic interests because such activities engage in
harmful rent-seeking.23 They see the logic of imposing such regulation to
be common sense. They view the First Amendment as the primary reason
we might be circumspect in imposing regulation on the political activities
of these groups.24 However, instead of focusing on the regulation of lobbying or political campaign activity, this Article focuses on whether we
should subsidize organizations whose primary purpose is to lobby and
engage in some political campaign activity.
Many scholars of the tax-exempt sector espouse the political science
theory of pluralism as a reason to strongly support exemption for a broad
range of nonprofit organizations.25 However, political scientists and

18.
19.
20.

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5) (2012).
Id. § 501(c)(4).
See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE
USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW, NO. 2013-10-053, at 3–5 (2013),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf (describing
how tax-exempt status is reviewed and determining that the IRS inappropriately reviewed some taxexempt applications).
21. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 191–92 (2012) (examining current lobbying regulations and proposing and justifying a
new national economic welfare rational for lobbying regulation).
22. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban,
VAL.
U.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2015),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475908 (exploring the constitutional status of
the corporate campaign contribution ban and effects of recent Supreme Court cases).
23. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 22; Hasen, supra note 21, at 226–35.
24. Hasen, supra note 21, at 234–40.
25. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (describing the “role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often
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economists long ago found that pluralism as a description of the political
universe misses significant factors in interest group formation. Mancur
Olson demonstrated that there are some groups and interests, such as the
poor, that are so large and latent that it is very difficult if not impossible
for them to organize even with a subsidy.26 A close study of business
leagues shows that they form with relative ease and appear to dominate
the interest group sector. Large, latent interests like the poor are rarely
able to organize. The subsidy is easily accessed by most business interests but rarely accessed by less powerful organized interests. Thus, instead of tax exemption operating as a neutral, democracy-enhancing law,
it likely does just the opposite by protecting and enhancing the status quo
of powerful interests.
A possible implication of this finding is that tax exemption may
generally harm democracy rather than improve it. If true, we should rethink the exemption of exempt organizations that represent the political
voice of various interests, such as social-welfare organizations, labor
unions, and business leagues. I do not take a position on this issue in this
Article. I plan to look in greater depth at the activities of these organizations in future articles. It might be that there are some interests that are
substantially underrepresented in our democracy, such that exemption
may be the right policy option. In this Article I simply maintain that the
exemption for business leagues is not needed as a market response. Additionally, the subsidy causes harm to our democracy by enhancing the
voice of an already powerful group.
Arguably, if we eliminated tax exemption for business leagues
many of them might be able to reorganize as social welfare organizations
and maintain exempt status. This seems highly likely, and for that reason
if there were an elimination of exemption for business leagues there
would need to be a similar closing of access to tax exemption under other
sections of the Code such as § 501(c)(4). Peak organizations such as the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce may still qualify. As will be discussed in the
Article in Part III.A, in many cases peak organizations actually do suffer
collective-action problems. So perhaps a move from one tax-exempt section to another makes sense. I argue, however, that the business-league
sector as a whole should be eliminated because, as will be seen below,
business interests are already well represented in our democracy and
providing these organizations extra money for greater voice is a bad idea.
Finally, business leagues are powerful. Removing exemption may
be politically impossible. As a second-best move, I recommend applying
a net-investment income tax on business leagues as is already applied on

sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints”); see also SALAMON, supra note 12, at 14; Gardner,
supra note 12, at xiii–xv.
26. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 57–59 (2d prtg. 1971).
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tax-exempt social clubs.27 The Clinton administration unsuccessfully
attempted to do just this in 1999.28 While this would not entirely limit the
subsidy to business leagues, it would modestly improve the status quo.29
As an important side benefit, eliminating exemption for business leagues
would reduce the need for the IRS to make a determination as to whether
a business league had engaged in too much political campaign intervention, a notoriously challenging problem for the IRS.30
Part I of this Article considers the scholarly literature regarding collective action as it relates to the formation of interest groups. Part II describes the requirements of qualifying as a tax-exempt business league
and the rationales justifying these organizations’ exemption. It then evaluates the implications of collective action theory for the exemption rationales. It additionally reviews taxing regimes that might apply to business leagues instead of a policy of tax exemption to provide a suitable
comparison. Part III provides a more detailed look at the activities of
business leagues by providing case studies regarding the three general
types of business leagues: peak organizations, trade associations, and
professional associations. Someone unfamiliar with business leagues
might choose to start first with Part III. The concrete examples of the
formation, maintenance, and activities of these organizations can help in
understanding the first two Parts of this Article. Part IV concludes that
ending exemption for business leagues is the right policy choice.
I. INTEREST GROUP MOBILIZATION AND THE COLLECTIVE-ACTION
PROBLEM
Ever since James Madison’s Federalist No. 10, we have been concerned in the United States about the ability of groups to unfairly influence our democracy. Madison referred to this problem as rule by faction.
By faction he meant a situation where either a minority or a majority of
citizens “are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.”31 However, Madison recognized
27. 26 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3) (2012). I made this argument regarding applying the net investment
income tax to the whole of the mutual-benefit organizations of the tax-exempt sector. See Hackney,
supra note 8, at 120–24.
28. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 278–82 (Comm. Print
1999), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2888; see also Jacob
M. Schlesinger, Clinton Plan to Tax Lobbyists’ Investment Gains Hits Home in a Fury of Faxes,
Letters, Web Sites, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1999, at A24 (describing the lobbyist efforts opposing the
proposed tax increase).
29. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 135–37 (discussing the deferral effect granted if only a net
investment tax is applied to such organizations).
30. Cf. Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next “Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41, 54–56 (2007) (considering whether the 26 U.S.C. § 527 rules
are mandatory for organizations that carry on as a political party but choose to operate as a taxable
entity).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2005).
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the absolute need for citizens to express their voice. Thus, instead of recommending the elimination of factions, Madison recommended a republican form of government along with the separation of powers.32 These
institutions he believed would limit the ability of any one particular
group to establish tyranny.33 To Madison, tyranny meant total control
over the government and the people by one group.34 Today, scholars continue to examine the problem of faction through the study of interest
groups.
All business leagues are interest groups. An interest group is “a collection of individuals or a group of individuals linked together by professional circumstance, or by common political, economic, or social interests” that satisfies three requirements: (1) the organization is not a political party, i.e., the name of the organization does not appear on a ballot;
(2) it uses some of its resources to try to influence legislative, judicial, or
executive decisions at any level of government; and (3) it is organized
outside of the government it intends to influence.35 Business leagues are
not political parties, they use significant resources to influence governmental decisions at all levels, and they are organized outside of government. Finally, although business leagues perform functions in addition to
acting as a governmental mouthpiece, “[i]nterest groups’ service organizations quite ironically are by-products of their lobbying organizations,
not the other way around.”36
Thus, studies regarding the interest group sector are relevant to a
study of business leagues. However, interest group literature is vast and
conflicting. For instance, research considering the effectiveness of interest groups in lobbying and electoral efforts is still relatively undeveloped.37 A researcher studying interest groups faces substantial problems
of proof given the vast complexity of the sector and its interaction with
the government.38 The researcher must often be able to measure actions
that are dynamic rather than static.39 Nevertheless, there is an area of
interest group research that has achieved great success: questions of col-

32. See id. at 51–53.
33. See id. at 51.
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 261 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
2005) (“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands . . .
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
35. JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND
INFLUENCE 22–23 (1996) (internal quotation mark omitted).
36. John Mark Hansen, The Political Economy of Group Membership, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
79, 94 (1985).
37. For a review of the state of the literature from a number of years ago, see FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS
AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 13–17, 128–29 (1998).
38. See id. at 18.
39. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 169–70. The authors conducted a longitudinal study providing new knowledge on the effectiveness of lobbying over a period of time and across
a wide range of organizations and interests. Id. at 1–2.
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lective action.40 This happens to be fortunate for this inquiry because the
question of collective action is the question of how well certain interest
group services fare in the marketplace. When are people and organizations able to organize in order to provide the interest group services they
desire?
Part I demonstrates that of all the interest group sectors, business interests face the least collective-action problem. In other words, business
interests as compared to labor, environmentalists, the poor, etc., face the
smallest amount of market failure in organizing to represent their interests before government. Instead of the business league subsidy working
to ensure our society has the right level of needed goods and services, it
may lead to an oversupply of business-league services. In turn, this could
lead to a democracy that is over reflective of business interests.
A. Pluralism Problems
When the study of interest groups and their impact on politics began
in earnest in the early to mid part of the twentieth century, there was a
belief that individuals who had an interest could and would express that
interest through a group if they had the desire.41 In the 1940s and1950s
pluralism reigned as the prevailing theory of group politics.42 Pluralism
holds that groups express the interests of the people to their government.43 Furthermore, interest groups provide the ideal vehicle to ensure
that our democracy most closely represents the interests of its people.44
To some theorists, “[t]here is no group without its interest. An interest . .
. is the equivalent of a group.”45 In this purist conception of pluralism, no
obstacles stand in the way of individuals who want to form an interest
group.46 Based on these principles, the pluralist asserted that in order to
know what a government is going to do, all you need do is study interest
group interaction and negotiation with each other and the government.47
There are two main strains of pluralism. In one version, the government acts as referee ensuring that a reasonable bargain is negotiated
among the interest groups of society.48 This is pluralism in a descriptive
40.
41.

See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 8.
See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at ix–x (1986).
42. SCOTT H. AINSWORTH, ANALYZING INTEREST GROUPS 5 (2002).
43. Id.; BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 48.
44. Id.
45. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES
211 (The Principia Press of Ill., Inc. 1949) (1908); see also Charles B. Hagan, The Group in a Political Science, in APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICS 38, 40 (Roland Young ed., 1958) (discussing the “group concept”).
46. See, e.g., Kay Lehman Schlozman, What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality
and the American Pressure System, 46 J. POL. 1006, 1007 & n.1 (1984) (discussing the pluralist
history).
47. AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 5.
48. DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC
OPINION 104–06 (1951).
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sense. Another version of pluralism, however, argues for the values of
pluralism in a prescriptive sense.49 The prescriptive pluralist believed we
should encourage the formation of groups to enhance our representational democracies’ closer reflection of the interest of its people.50 Some taxexempt scholars argue in favor of tax exemption from this prescriptive
approach. For example, some argue that providing exemption to nonprofit organizations is a part of the solution to ensuring a more representative
democracy.51 By providing a subsidy for the formation of groups, we
encourage everyone to form groups to represent their interests to the
government and the government will thereby be more reflective of all the
people’s interests.
In what is known as the disturbance theory of interest group formation, David Truman, a pluralist, said that interest groups form in
waves.52 For Truman, a political interest group is made up of individuals
with shared interests and claims upon others that the group attempts to
satisfy through the governmental process.53 When individuals determine
they have a need that can only be delivered by government, i.e., a need
where “rights are not well established and negotiation costs are high,”54
those individuals will organize a group to ask the government to fulfill
that need. This simple act of organization disturbs the status quo.55 That
disturbance sends waves through the political system because another set
of individuals will organize in reaction to offset the demands of the first
group.56 In Truman’s theory, groups form in greatest numbers during
times of change, such as technological, social, economic, or political.57
E. E. Schattschneider criticized the pluralist claim famously stating
that “[t]he flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings
with a strong upper-class accent.”58 Although there are plenty of interest
groups that form, he said, the groups that form overwhelmingly represent
the interests of the wealthy rather than the average citizen.59 For
Schattschneider, there are those groups that work for public interest and

49. AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 6; JEFFREY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST
GROUP SOCIETY 11 (5th ed. 2009).
50. AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 6; BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 49, at 11.
51. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the “role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply
conflicting, activities and viewpoints”); see also SALAMON, supra note 12, at 15–17 (explaining that
nonprofit organizations are essential to the sense of community which is required to uphold a democratic polity); Gardner, supra note 12, at xiii–xv (stating that nonprofit organizations foster creativity
and nurture our “national life”).
52. TRUMAN, supra note 48, at 59.
53. Id. at 33.
54. AINSWORTH, supra note 41, at 13.
55. TRUMAN, supra note 48, at 59–62.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 57; see also AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 13.
58. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 35.
59. Id. at 31–34.
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those that work for private, or special, interests.60 The distinction between the two groups is the exclusive character of one over the other.61
Thus, a group that works for world peace or child welfare is not exclusive, but the National Association of Manufacturers is exclusive—only
manufacturers can belong.62 These exclusive organizations are “special
interests.”63 Additionally, there are those that are organized and those
that are not organized. Only the organized can impact the rights of the
community and the political process.64 To Schattschneider, to understand
politics you should study small groups.65 As Schattschneider said, “It has
been assumed that only legal barriers inhibited the disfranchised. We
know better now. The exclusion of people by extralegal processes, by
social processes, by the way the political system is organized and structured may be far more effective than the law.”66
In 1965, Mancur Olson offered a theoretical basis for why the interest-group system is biased in favor of the “upperclass” and business interests as Schattschneider contended.67 This theory also supported the
claim that not all groups with an interest can or will organize. He demonstrated through his economic model that small homogenous groups can
form with relative ease while large latent groups form with great challenge, if at all.68 The difference between a small homogenous group and
a large latent group is at once self-explanatory, but also a matter of basic
economic principles. Groups form to provide collective goods that cannot be provided through individual action.69 However, interest groups
face significant free-rider problems because of the collective nature of
the goods interest groups necessarily primarily provide.70 With the freerider problem, public goods that cost less than the return one person will
receive in return will be provided; public goods that cost more than the
return to one person will be provided at inefficient levels, or will not be
provided at all. And, this is the economic defining characteristic of a
large latent group: “in a large group in which no single individual’s contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a whole . . . it is
certain that a collective good will not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside inducements.”71
Olson evaluated whether his theory explained specific group contexts that he could observe. He noted that within the trade association
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71,

Id. at 22.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 111.
OLSON, supra note 26, at 142–45.
Id. at 48–58.
Id. at 15–16.
Id.
Id. at 44.
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context, the collective-action problem will typically hinder the formation
of all except small groups of narrow interests.72 Larger groups will be
forced to either use outside inducements by selling what Olson referred
to as “selective incentives,” such as insurance or information, or obtain
coercion from a source like the state.73 Olson defined selective incentives
as private goods, such as insurance, or administrative operations, or discounts on other goods, and services that are sold by a group to induce
members to join.74 Groups provide selective incentives because the public good is by its own terms available whether the individual joins or not.
With respect to trade associations, Olson provided anecdotal evidence as to the size of the trade association pressure community.75 A
lobbying index from the late 1940s provided evidence that trade associations made up about two-thirds of the interest group community.76 That
type of representation dwarfed any other type of interest at that time.77
Olson asserts that business dominance of the interest group sector “must
be due in large part to the fact that the business community is divided
into a series of (generally oligopolistic) ‘industries,’ each of which contains only a fairly small number of firms.”78 Olson suggests that in most
instances the trade associations involved in the pressure community have
a relatively small number of members.79 At the time of his writing, the
median number of members of a trade association was somewhere between 24 and 50.80 Today, membership of trade associations still tends to
be small—the median number of memberships of American business
associations in 2002–2003 was 353.81
In spite of the numerical superiority, there are latent interests in the
business community that face collective action problems.82 For instance,
the business community as an interest in its own right is represented by
peak organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. This broad
business interest is not made up of small homogenous interests and thus
faces problems with organizing consistent with other large latent inter72. Russell Hardin provides a useful definition here suggesting that the idea of a small group
may include hundreds of organizations, each of whom would benefit, or lose, so significantly from a
change that it is worthwhile for each one of the organizations to spend on the collective benefit.
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 12 (1982). Hardin suggests that the oil industry, for instance, has hundreds of organizations involved, but would still be a small group under this definition.
Id.
73. OLSON, supra note 26, at 133–35.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 141.
76. Id. (citing to Lobby Index 1946–1949, H.R. REP. NO. 3197 (1950)).
77.
Id.
78. Id. at 143 (emphasis omitted).
79. Id. at 144–45.
80. Id. at 144.
81. LYN SPILLMAN, SOLIDARITY IN STRATEGY 83 (2012). In 2002–2003, the median membership of American business associations was 353, and 45% of American business associations are
made up of memberships between 100 and 1000. Id. Only 7% have more than 10,000 members. Id.
at 84.
82. OLSON, supra note 26, at 143–45.
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ests. Professional associations, too, represent a large group of people
whose interests are not entirely homogenous; such groups face collective-action problems too. While professionals often manage to form into
groups, the individuals with such professional interests need to find
means other than the collective good, consisting of promoting and lobbying for the particular professional interest, to entice people to join the
group. Thus, organizations like the medical societies and the American
Medical Association (AMA), discussed in more detail in Part III below,
and the bar associations and the American Bar Association (ABA), primarily overcome the collective-action problem by obtaining governmentrelated coercion.83 These associations establish licensing systems at the
state level and require significant educational requirements to force
membership via coercion.84 Thus, professional associations manage to
operate “closed shop[s],” so desired by labor unions.85
Professional associations do not rely on coercive efforts alone to
solve the collective action problem; they also use selective incentives
that often have a strong compulsory nature.86 For instance, legal malpractice insurance is often hard to find outside of the bar association. They
sell publications too that strongly connect the professional community
and provide opportunities to network.87 Of course, as we will see in Part
III below in the case of the AMA, and in part in the case of the Cotton
Trade Institute, these associations may also control a code that industry
players must purchase from the association in order to operate in the industry. These codes can provide the business group substantial monetary
support, particularly where it has the imprimatur of the state.88
B. Research on the Collective-Action Problem
Although many criticize Olson’s theory, the central instinct that
small, economic special-interest groups possess a significant advantage
over other groups in organizing has not been contradicted by later research. The critiques of Olson’s theory focus on the fact that under his
theory there should be few to no broad-based public interest groups.89
Thus, consumer and environmental groups should not form with any
great regularity.90 However, after Olson wrote, these two types of interests proliferated. Modelers of Olson’s theory predict that less than 5% of
a latent population should mobilize, but in many instances some strongly
83. Id. at 137.
84. Id. at 138.
85. Id.
86. OLSON, supra note 26, at 137–39.
87. Id. at 140.
88. JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA 76 (1991).
89. See, e.g., id. at 45–48 (discussing the irony of a focus on the problems of collective action
at the time when there were so many social movements managing to overcome this very problem);
Grant Jordan & William A. Maloney, How Bumble-bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Participation, 44 POL. STUD. 668, 668–70 (1996).
90. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 90, at 45–48.
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public-oriented interests have obtained population slices that are much
greater than that.91 Some research thus takes a look at why and how these
interests are able to overcome the collective-action problem.92 This research considers how selective incentives work in solving the collectiveaction problem and whether other incentives may play a role.93
Nevertheless, the evidence discussed in the next three sections below shows business interests maintain an overwhelming advantage in
interest group formation.94 Not surprisingly, individuals and entities with
the resources to organize—i.e., money, facilities, and skilled professional
individuals—organize to represent their interests with greater ease than
other individuals and entities. Finally, research demonstrates that interest
groups (1) obtain a large share of their resources from a few large wellfinanced members, and (2) the organizations tend to follow the lead of
those members.95
1. Bias in the Interest Group System Leans Heavily Towards Business Interests
Empirical evidence confirms that there is a bias in the interest group
system towards business interests.96 In a simple review of interest groups
that lobbied in Washington in 1981, Schlozman found that business
leagues comprised 24.8% of the total interests.97 Corporations themselves comprised 45.7% of that interest group community engaged in
federal lobbying.98 Foreign commerce and corporations made up another
6.5% of those represented.99 All other identified groups amounted to only
13% of the total Washington D.C. interest group community.100 This
small portion was composed of labor unions, public interest groups, civil
rights groups and minority organizations, social welfare and the poor, the
elderly, gays, women, handicapped, and governmental units.101 Schlozman showed that compared to the interests of the U.S. population as a

91. Scott Sigmund Gartner & Gary M. Segura, Appearances Can Be Deceptive: SelfSelection, Social Group Identification, and Political Mobilization, 9 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 131,
134 (1997).
92. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 90, at 60–61; Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of
Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1, 21–22 (1969).
93. See infra Part I.D.
94. See, e.g., SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 31; SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 41,
at 49–50; WALKER, supra note 90, at 58–59; Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Representation: The
Dominance of Institutions, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 64, 70 (1984).
95. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 74–75.
96. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 31–33; SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 41, at
49–50; WALKER, supra note 90, at 61; Salisbury, supra note 94, at 70.
97. See Schlozman, supra note 46, at 1012 tbl.1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
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whole, this interest group system is skewed away from the actual interests of all the people of the country.102
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady updated this same work in a recent
book The Unheavenly Chorus.103 In their review the authors emphasize a
point that cannot be understated: business has a significant organizational
advantage in that it already has the skills, power, and resources to organize.104 We should thus not find it surprising that business interests would
be so adept at organizing. In a strict counting of groups within the entire
interest group system in 2001, the authors find that business interests
continue to dominate.105 Business leagues, including trade associations
and professional associations, altogether make up a full 20% of represented interests.106 Individual corporations still are the predominant lobbyist group at approximately 35%.107 The next closest in representation
are state and local governments with 10.4%.108 Labor unions are only 1%
of the interest group population, education 4.2%, health 3.5%, and social
welfare and poor make up 0.8%.109 Public interest consists of 4.6% while
identity groups 3.8%.110
How do these numbers compare to the 1981 numbers?111 Intriguingly, while the nominal business interests have grown they have not kept
pace with the growth of some other sectors. The sectors that have grown
significantly are health (883%), education (612%) and state and local
governments (382%).112 Realistically though this growth is likely directly
related to business interests associated with healthcare and education, as
health and education have both boomed as industries in this period.
While this reflects real growth, part of the sizable growth is because
there were almost no groups lobbying in these fields in 1981. For instance, there were eleven public educational institutions and nineteen
private educational institutions lobbying in 1981.113 Thus, while business
interests may have grown, their relative growth turns out to make them a
smaller set of the interest community. Corporations decreased relatively
almost a full 10%, while trade associations decreased by almost 5%.114
This does not mean that business interests as a total amount are less than
in 1981. Business interests did increase, but business interest growth did
102.
103.

Id. at 1011–13.
KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY
CHORUS 312 (2012).
104. Id. at 316.
105. Id. at 321 tbl.11.3.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 352–53.
112. Id. at 353 tbl.12.1.
113. Id. at 359.
114. Id. at 356 tbl.12.2.
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not keep pace with some other significant interests. However, as noted, it
could be that some of that significant growth in the health and education
sector should be associated with the business interests that we are considering here.
Schlozman et. al. primarily approach the question of interest group
representation from the question of political voice inequality. They find
that “[c]onsistent with Schattschneider’s analysis . . . the economically
disadvantaged are underrepresented in pressure politics.”115 Notably in
the case of unions, the authors observe that because labor unions are so
small comparatively, they are forced to spread their limited capacity
across a wide spectrum of issues.116 Not inconsistent with the point above
that business interests have the skills, power and resources to organize,
as demonstrated by the numbers reported above, professional associations alone outnumber unions by a far shot.117
Lowery and Gray criticize these interest group studies that rely on a
simple count of the number of interest groups that lobby because the
studies, they say, fail to use a baseline upon which to judge bias in the
interest system.118 They claim that the authors have no method of judging
what an interest group ecosystem should be expected to look like.119 Despite the critique, Lowery and Gray in a recent book with co-author Benz
consider the question of the count of organizations at the state level and
find that the representation bias at the state level is even more severe.120
For instance, business interests made up 73.8% of the lobbying community in 1997 as compared to 62% at the federal level one year prior in
1996.121 In other work, Gray and Lowery along with other authors provide strong support for the Olson claim that the smaller the set of persons
to organize within an interest the greater likelihood that group will organize.122 They show there is a direct correlation between a larger number of business firms in a state and a lower number of such firms independently lobbying.123 Despite the baseline critique, Lowery and Gray
recognize that none of their objections disproves the high degree of like-

115. Id. at 321.
116. Id. at 326.
117. Id. at 327 tbl.11.4.
118. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, Bias in the Heavenly Chorus: Interests in Society and
Before Government, 16 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 9 (2004).
119. Id. at 6.
120. VIRGINIA GRAY, DAVID LOWERY & JENNIFER K. BENZ, INTEREST GROUPS AND HEALTH
CARE REFORM ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 23–25 (2013).
121. Id. at 23.
122. David Lowery et al., Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions, 66 J. POL. 684,
685 (2004).
123. Id. at 686; see also Sally Conway Kilbane & John H. Beck, Professional Associations and
the Free Rider Problem: The Case of Optometry, 65 PUB. CHOICE 181, 185 (1990) (finding similar
results regarding the organizing efforts of optometrists being more challenged in larger states with a
larger population).
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lihood that business interests are relatively over represented in our political system.124
Gray and Lowery have also added to interest group organizational
knowledge by providing evidence that only a finite number of groups can
exist in an interest group system.125 Their model demonstrates that the
number of interest groups in any interest group system is not infinite, as
the pluralists seemed to suggest, and as tax-exemption literature often
seems to accept.126 Under their approach, a certain population density
supports a limited number of groups as a result of population resources
and ability of the government to interact with a certain number of
groups.127 Once that saturation level is reached, it is much harder for
more interests to form. Tax exemption of business leagues may very well
help to crowd out other interests that never organize because they are
crowded out. This is consistent with the findings that the status quo is
incredibly powerful in the interest group system.128
2. Use of Selective and Purposive Incentives to Organize
After Olson’s seminal collective action work, many interest group
scholars focused on how latent organizations, such as environmental
interests, form despite the significant collective action challenge such
groups should face. The research has focused on the sale of selective
incentives and purposive incentives. This area of research still needs
significant work, but the quest to determine the level of difficulty some
groups may experience in organizing has had some success.
Olson did not initially consider the possibility of selling membership to interest groups through purposive incentives; purposive incentives refer to the sale of the promotion of ideas that people strongly support from a moral or emotional basis.129 Olson had argued that the primary way of solving the collective-action problem would be to sell selective
incentives such as insurance and magazines.130 However, contrary to
Olson’s suggestion, research demonstrates that many organizations are
able to sell membership on a cause-related basis. For instance, people
will pay for membership in the Sierra Club to be associated with the
cause of environmentalism. Cause-related incentives are typically referred to in the literature as “purposive incentives.”131 Still, citizen

124. Lowery & Gray, supra note 120, at 23.
125. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural
Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1, 25 (1995).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 233, 244.
129. Salisbury, supra note 96, at 16.
130. HARDIN, supra note 72, at 31.
131. See, e.g., Salisbury, supra note 96, at 15–16.
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groups and other interests also sell selective incentives to overcome the
collective-action problem identified by Olson.132
Robert Salisbury introduced a model to explain group formation
that he called the exchange theory of formation.133 His model provides
support for a conclusion that business groups should be in a much better
position to form than cause-related groups. Consistent with Olson’s assumption that people join groups for selfish reasons, he viewed group
formation as taking place within the context of a marketplace.134 Under
the exchange theory, entrepreneurs form groups to sell material, solidary,
or expressive benefits to members for a price.135 In other words, rather
than these nonprofits being “voluntary” associations, they sell goods and
services in the market just like for-profit firms. An entrepreneur will not
form a group nor maintain it unless he is able to make the profit that he
desires.
Salisbury focuses two major factors of interest group formation: (1)
groups tend to form when the economy is on the upswing, and (2) groups
most commonly rely upon material benefits to form.136 Because material
benefits are likely less elastic than purposive benefits we should expect
that groups that rely on purposive benefits, such as the American Civil
Liberties Union, will experience greater difficulty forming and maintaining status than those that rely on material benefits.137 In other words, in
the case of purposive-based groups, member contributions will be a function of member income; if member income goes down, membership for
an organization that sells purposive incentives should fall at a greater rate
than for an organization that offers material incentives.138
James Q. Wilson studied the ways certain groups overcome the collective-action problem by offering purposive incentives.139 Contrary to
the claim that individuals are purely rational economic actors, Wilson
found that some people have a stronger sense of duty than others and join
groups to support a particular cause.140 Typically joining these groups is
low cost and low involvement,141 and these cause-related groups have
developed effective means of persuading individuals to join; they emphasize the threat of loss rather than gain because psychologically, the
132. Peter B. Clark & James Q. Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations, 6
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129, 130–31 (1961); Hansen, supra note 36, at 79–82; Lowery & Gray, supra note
120, at 15.
133. Salisbury, supra note 96, at 2.
134. Id. at 17.
135. Id. at 17–19.
136. Id. at 8, 17–18.
137. Id. at 19–20.
138. Id.
139. JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, at viii–xii (Princeton Univ. Press 1995)
(1974).
140. Id. at viii–ix. But cf. WALKER, supra note 90, at 47 (criticizing arguments about the rationality of purposive benefits).
141. See WILSON, supra note 141, at ix.
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threat of loss appears to remain a stronger force in our minds. 142 Finally,
cause-related groups often rely on a wealthy sponsor; their contributions
make the cost of membership much lower.143 This last detail is discussed
in more detail in Section 3 below.
Terry M. Moe demonstrates that there are individuals who systematically overestimate their importance to the accomplishment of a cause.
These individuals join to support an effort that they cannot really aid to
the extent they believe.144 In other words, members join out of selfinterest, but they make a mistake in believing that their contributions
“make a difference.”145 Moe concludes from this that the collectiveaction problem is solved more often than Olson’s theory would have
predicted because individuals make mistakes about the return they will
receive from the investment of time or money they make in a large organization.146 However, it does not mean that such groups form with
greater ease than those with the proper resources and material incentives
to sell.
John Hansen’s work provides further support for the claim that
while larger, latent interests can form by selling purposive incentives,
once formed, these groups often need to sell selective incentives in order
to maintain status. Furthermore, business groups are in a far better position to generate incentives to sell. Hansen found that a group forms first
in response to a threat as suggested by the pluralist disturbance theories.147 The newly formed group generates political benefits by responding to the threat in a political sense. However, in order to maintain or
increase its membership, the group often must sell selective incentives
such as insurance.148 This work supports the claim that small groups have
little trouble forming without selective incentives. For instance, industry
groups dominated in the early twentieth century because of their small
size and easy access to resources to organize.149
The importance of all this work is that cause-related groups can
form, but they face much greater challenge than do business groups.
Even though cause-related groups might be able to find selective incentives to sell, the business community naturally tends to possess the right
material incentives to sell, and the right human and capital resources to
organize.

142.
143.
144.

Id. at x.
Id. at xii.
TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL
DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS 205–07 (1980).
145. Id. at 205–06.
146. Id. at 222.
147. Hansen, supra note 36, at 81.
148. Id. at 93–94.
149. Id. at 94.
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Business groups, though, appear to have an additional advantage.
They tend to be able to coopt the government to support their efforts.150
During war time, Hansen points out, industry groups are boosted dramatically by government efforts to co-opt producers into the war efforts.
These periods tend to be highly profitable, and long lasting for building
and maintaining organizational structure, for industry groups.151
The work on incentives demonstrates that some latent interests can
overcome the collective-action problem. However, none of this work
suggests that latent interests are able to overcome the natural ability of
business interests to organize. Furthermore, as will be discussed in more
detail in the next section, even where the collective-action problem is
solved, evidence shows that group managers often do not reflect the majority interest of the members. Different interest distortions occur in different types of groups. The general finding is that wealthy donors often
set the agenda of an interest group. This finding holds even in the case of
business interests. This next section looks at this important matter.
3. Wealthy Interests Tend to Aid in the Formation of Many Groups
Many interest groups solve the collective-action problem through
the contributions of wealthy individuals or entities. These high-wealth
individuals or entities provide significantly larger sums than the average
member.152 Although this solution to the collective-action problem is
more prevalent among citizen groups, business interests often solve the
collective-action problem through wealthy interests as well.153 These
wealthy contributors tend to substantially influence the direction of the
group. Fundraisers often live by a rule that 80% to 90% of support of an
organization will come from 10% to 20% of the contributors.154 This
appears true for business leagues as well. These organizations tend to
rely on a few loyalists for their support.155 In the trade association context, for instance, member dues are often paid on a sliding-scale basis
such that large corporations pay the predominant portion of member
dues.156
Jack Walker found that that sale of selective incentives simply
could not explain the explosion of citizen interest groups in the 1970s.157
While some of that growth could be explained by the selective-incentives
150. Hansen, supra note 36, at 93–94.
151. Id.; see also AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 27 (stating that government involvement with
trade associations in the early twentieth century was often associated with getting a more technocratic result instead of following the politics of spoils).
152. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 32.
153. See Michael L. Barnett, One Voice, But Whose Voice? Exploring What Drives Trade
Association Activity, 52 BUS. & SOC’Y 213, 219 (2012).
154. L. PETER EDLES, FUNDRAISING: HANDS-ON TACTICS FOR NONPROFIT GROUPS 11 (1993).
155. BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 32.
156. WALKER, supra note 90, at 83–84.
157. Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 390, 396 (1983).
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theory of Olson,158 Walker found that many groups located important
new sources of funds outside their membership.159 In fact, 89% of the
citizen groups received outside sources of funds, while only 34% of
business associations did.160 Walker found that the citizen groups overwhelmingly received their funds from wealthy patrons.161 However, his
data showed that they are an important source for all of the interest group
sectors including business interests.162 Additionally, the citizen group
beliefs overwhelmingly tracked the political beliefs of the wealthy patrons.163 Others have found highly similar results with respect to trade
associations as well.164
Recent research has confirmed the large influence of wealth also on
our country’s policy choices. While no one has been able to conclusively
prove that interest groups controlled by wealthy interests have caused
this state of affairs, several authors marshal evidence demonstrating the
dominating role that business elites play in shaping public policy and the
agendas of our two major political parties.165 Other authors claim that the
process works to make the rich richer.166 Martin Gilens recently demonstrated that our government policy choices are “strongly tilted toward the
most affluent citizens.”167 While in his recent book he did not attribute
the cause of that tilt to any substantial interest group role,168 a more recent article seems to support the biased pluralism model described
above.169 We should not be surprised at this. Recent research shows that
wealthier individuals are much more likely to vote, contribute to campaigns, and engage in the political process than all other less-wealthy
cohorts.170 Nevertheless, it is a cause for concern regarding the health of
our democracy.
This Section challenged the pluralist argument that subsidizing any
and all groups is a good thing. Not all groups face the same challenges in
organizing and maintaining status. Some groups find the challenge to
organize much harder than others. The evidence shows that business
interests have had the least difficulty in organizing. Furthermore, evi158. For instance, the AARP succeeds in part by selling a lot of insurance. Id.
159. Id. at 398.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. WALKER, supra note 90, at 79.
163. Walker, supra note 159, at 401–02.
164. Barnett, supra note 155, at 219.
165. See, e.g., G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? CHALLENGES TO CORPORATE
AND CLASS DOMINANCE 153 (6th ed. 2010); Fred Block, Understanding the Diverging Trajectories
of the United States and Western Europe: A Neo-Polanyian Analysis, 35 POL. & SOC’Y 3, 18–19
(2007).
166. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 19 (2010).
167. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE 1 (2012).
168. Id. at 161.
169. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 573–74 (2014).
170. See SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 105, at 21–22.
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dence that organizations form at a greater rate than Olson predicted does
not undermine the central instinct that many latent public interests face
much greater challenges to organize than do business interests. Finally,
even when organized, we can expect that the views expressed by the
group will not mimic the majority interests of members, but will instead
mimic the interests of the wealthy few.
C. Importance of Groups
None of this is to say that the joining of groups is a bad thing. Nor
does this Article make the claim that business leagues serve no useful or
important purpose. Comparative studies have shown that a significant
sector of publically available organizations is essential to a healthy democracy.171 Voluntary organizations have been shown to be a great educator of Americans in how the democratic process works.172 Voluntary
organizations tend to promote a greater participation in that process.173
Additionally, these organizations, including those supporting business
interests bring important information to legislators and agency officials.
For instance, as Schlozman, Verba, and Brady note, “Organizations are
particularly likely to be in a position to provide expert information that is
useful in the formulation of policy.”174 In the 1920s and 30s for instance,
before our country had built a substantial bureaucracy, the U.S. looked to
trade associations and professional associations over governmental
agents for technocratic expertise.175 Many thought more highly of the
technical expertise of the trade associations than the often highly partisan
government officials.176
These last ideas are consistent with the “informational theory” of interest groups, which suggests that you typically find interest groups on
both sides of an issue.177 Additionally, interest groups are more effective
when they provide useful reliable information to legislators.178 Under the
informational theory, interest groups that provide bad information will
not succeed.179 Thus, under the informational theory, we should expect
most interest groups to provide useful information to legislators without
imposing any particular restrictions on their actions. This work supports
a claim that interest groups play a real and useful role in government.

171. See GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 300–01 (1963).
172. See THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY 98–107 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1572–73 (1988).
173. Jan Leighley, Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation, 58 J.
POL. 447, 447 (1996).
174. SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 105, at 4.
175. See, e.g., MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 5 (1993).
176. See id.
177. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 174.
178. Id. at 174–75.
179. See id.

288

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:2

This Article does not question the informational theory of interest
groups. It accepts that interest groups, including business leagues, fulfill
this important informational role. This Article contends instead that because of the significant bias in favor of business interests in the interest
group sector, a subsidy should not be provided to the business interest
group sector.
D. Conclusion
As Schattschneider said, the interest group system appears to sing
with a distinctly “upper-class bias.”180 The evidence to date demonstrates
that business interest groups overwhelmingly dominate the voices that
are heard on Capital Hill. Tax exemption provides a subsidy to these
business interests through § 501(c)(6). Based on the evidence of such a
significant bias towards business, a subsidy is entirely unjustified.
II. QUALIFYING AS A TAX-EXEMPT BUSINESS LEAGUE AND THE
RATIONALES FOR SUCH EXEMPTION
Although there is no legislative history, the exemption for business
leagues appears in the Income Tax Act of 1913.181 It seems to originate
from a Chamber of Commerce request to exempt “civic and commercial”
organizations.182 “Commercial” organizations, the Chamber told Congress, are not “selfish,” perform “civic functions,” and work to improve
commerce in the interest of all citizens.183 To tax these organizations
would be to limit their public usefulness. The Chamber argued that civic
and commercial organizations should not be taxed for the same “common sense” reason many argue charities should not be taxed—they provide a public benefit in return for the subsidy of exemption.184 Contemporaneous documents suggest that the government was very open to the
idea that these trade organizations played an important public role at the
time.185

180. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 31.
181. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
182. See Hearings on Tariff Schedules of the Revenue Act of 1913 Before the Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong. 2001 (1913) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of U.S. Chamber of
Commerce); see also Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 478 (1979) (discussing the Chamber of Commerce written testimony and finding it persuasive as to the legislative
intent of Congress).
183. Hearings, supra note 184, at 2002.
184. Id.
185. E.A. BRAND, BUREAU OF MANUFACTURES, DEP’T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, SPECIAL
AGENTS SERIES—NO. 60, COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS: RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
PROMOTIVE ACTIVITIES OF SEVENTY ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 7–8 (1912). Issued by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, the report suggests that while these trade organizations had
existed for some time, it was only after the turn of the century that these organizations came to
fruition; chambers of commerce, the report notes, were just beginning to wield significant influence
within communities. Id. at 7. The monograph discusses the ways chambers of commerce, boards of
trade, commercial associations, manufacturers associations, etc. engage in the development of foreign trade, wholesale trade and retail trade, the promotion of transportation and industrial expansion,
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A. Qualifying for Exemption as a Business League
The statute exempts from federal income tax “[b]usiness leagues,
chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues.”186 To qualify as a business league, the Treasury
regulations provide that an organization must be formed to promote a
common business interest and must direct its activities towards the improvement of business conditions in one or more lines of business as
distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual
persons.187 For instance, a business league cannot promote one product
among a lot of products that are operating in one line of business, such as
a particular brand of auto-part.188 To maintain tax exemption, a business
league may neither perform specific services for its members as a primary activity189 nor “engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit.”190 Consistent with the rest of the tax-exempt sector,
the Code explicitly prohibits business leagues from organizing for profit
and from allowing earnings to inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.191
Unlike a charitable organization, whose political campaign activity
is absolutely prohibited and lobbying limited,192 a business league may
lobby as a primary purpose and may advocate for a candidate as long as
it is not the organization’s primary purpose.193 In fact, lobbying and influencing politics is generally a primary function of a business league.
Under the law of tax-exempt organizations, to intervene in a campaign
means to advocate for or against a candidate for public office directly or
indirectly.194 Lobbying, on the other hand, refers to either directly conthe establishment of conventions, and efforts to bring about civic improvements. Id. at 3–4. The
publication evinces a sense that these organizations provide huge benefits to the country.
186. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012). Congress added “professional football leagues” to the
statute in 1966. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, sec. 6(a), § 501(c)(6), 80 Stat. 1508, 1515
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012)) (ensuring the National Football League is a
tax exempt organization). Senator Coburn recently made efforts to end exemption for sports leagues
such as the NFL. PRO Sports Act, S. 1524, 113th Cong. (2013).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)–1 (1960).
188. See id.
189. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-65, 1956-1 C.B. 199, clarified by Rev. Rul. 65-164, 1965-1 C.B.
238 and Rev. Rul. 72-211, 1972-1 C.B. 150 (providing information solely to members of the industry is a specific service for members and does not qualify as the exempt purpose of operating a
business league).
190. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)–1; see also Credit Bureau of Greater N.Y., Inc. v. Comm’r, 162
F.2d 7, 7–9 (2d Cir. 1947) (selling credit information and collection services is not a business league
exempt purpose); Underwriters’ Labs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 135 F.2d 371, 372–74 (7th Cir. 1943) (testing electronic equipment for safety does not qualify as a business league exempt purpose).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)–1.
192. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
193. Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117; Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of
Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 passim (2011)
(discussing the constitutionality of limiting the speech of nonprofits by limiting their ability to intervene in a political campaign).
194. John Francis Reilly and Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying Activity of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING
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tacting, or encouraging people to contact, legislators to vote for or
against certain legislation.195
Courts interpret the term “business” in § 501(c)(6) broadly. For instance, the Tax Court has stated that the term business “embraces everything about which a person can be employed.”196 Thus, industry, manufacturing, and retail are included within the term business, as is any profession, such as the medical profession.197 Although non-professional
workers could have been included within the term business as well, as
could have farm-related business interests, these groups have a separate
section dedicated to them under the Code.198 The IRS has accepted that
even students of a particular profession can form an organization devoted
to promoting business.199 A hobby, however, rather than a strict business
does not qualify.200
The IRS and courts also interpret “promote” in § 501(c)(6) liberally.
For instance, hosting lunch meetings to discuss business-related issues
qualifies,201 although simply providing facilities for members for lunch
does not.202 Networking to exchange business prospect information does
not promote common business interests either.203 Publishing a newspaper
related to the interests of fisherman,204 establishing a trust for the purpose
of collecting, administering and disbursing funds to business leagues,205
and holding semi-annual meetings to discuss technical problems with
information data sharing206 all qualify as valid activities to promote a
common business interest. A business league that issues a “seal of acceptance” highlighting that the league approves of member products
qualifies.207 Similarly, an organization that creates a model building and
construction code, and tests products, is considered to be conducting a
suitable activity.208 Negotiating with labor on behalf of industry is a valid

PROGRAM EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, at L-4
(2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick03.pdf.
195. Id.
196. Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Comm’r, 7 T.C. 1449, 1465 (1946), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 1.
197. Rev. Rul. 73-567, 1973-2 C.B. 178.
198. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5).
199. Rev. Rul. 77-112, 1977-1 C.B. 149.
200. See Am. Kennel Club, Inc. v. Hoey, 148 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1945).
201. Rev. Rul. 67-295, 1967-2 C.B. 197.
202. Rev. Rul. 70-244, 1970-1 C.B. 132.
203. Rev. Rul. 59-391, 1959-2 C.B. 151.
204. Rev. Rul. 75-287, 1975-2 C.B. 211.
205. Rev. Rul. 82-138, 1982-2 C.B. 106.
206. Rev. Rul. 74-147, 1974-1 C.B. 136.
207. Rev. Rul. 70-187, 1970-1 C.B. 131 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-17-004 (Jan. 1, 1981); cf. Am. Plywood Ass’n v. United
States, 267 F. Supp. 830, 831–33, 836 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (holding that plywood association that
only sold a trademark to its members qualified because over 90% of the industry belonged to the
association and, even if it was a service for members alone, the trademark issue would not be more
than an incidental amount of activity of the association leaving the organization operating primarily
for its exempt purpose).
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activity to promote a common business interest.209 Finally, “working for
the enactment of legislation designed to improve their competitive standing in the various lines of business, industry, etc., in which they are engaged” is a perfectly fine activity for a business league.210
There are limitations placed on a business league’s ability to sell selective services to its members. As mentioned above, a business league
may not provide goods and services exclusively to members. For instance, the American Automobile Association, an association of individual car owners, failed to qualify as a business league because its activity
was to provide services solely to members.211 However, there are some
seemingly contradictory rulings in this area. In the seal of acceptance
ruling above, the IRS ruled that this service to members was a legitimate
business-league activity because the vast majority of the industry (over
90%) participated in the particular business league at issue.212 That said,
there seems to be an ambiguous requirement that member income be at a
“meaningful level.”213 This is probably to ensure that the organization is
broadly acting on behalf of the particular business or industry rather than
running a for-profit business. In a General Counsel Memorandum
(GCM) the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS (Chief Counsel)
opined that an organization that received a significant source of its income from the sale of insurance could not qualify as a business league
because it lacked enough member support.214 An organization that provides rebates to members but not non-members also fails to qualify as a
business league.215
Operating for private businesses alone is prohibited. The Supreme
Court has found that Treasury regulations establishing a line of business
requirement are valid.216 This means a business league cannot be established for a particular brand name product or service. The business
league must be formed to support the general product or the service. The
seminal case is National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States.217
There, a business league established to support the Midas brand of muffler failed to satisfy the line-of-business requirement as established by
long-held Treasury regulations because it supported one brand rather
than the line of business involved.218 The Court relied substantially on
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Comm’r, 7 T.C. 1449, 1465 (1946), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 1.
Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117.
Am. Auto. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 1146, 1157–61 (1953).
See Rev. Rul. 70-187, 1970-1 C.B. 131.
John Francis Reilly et al., IRC 501(c)(6) Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROGRAM EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003, at K-12 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick03.pdf.
214. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,723 (Apr. 8, 1988).
215. Mich. Mobile Home & Recreational Vehicle Inst. v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 770, 777–78
(1976).
216. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477, 483–84, 488–89 (1979).
217. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
218. Id. at 473, 483–84, 488–89.

292

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:2

the submitted testimony of the U.S. Chamber regarding why business
leagues should be considered exempt from taxation on the enactment of
the original exemption for business leagues in 1913.219 A line of business
in most cases according to the Court involves “either an entire industry
or all components of an industry within a geographic area.”220 The IRS
recently won a case against Bluetooth Sig, Inc., the maker of a remote
technology, because it was formed to support the Bluetooth product rather than the product in general.221 The Bluetooth court found that the
difference between the trademark involved in American Plywood and the
trademark involved in Bluetooth was that Bluetooth expressly created
this new business opportunity rather than coming upon a business that
was actively engaged by numerous organizations already.222
Finally, and seemingly redundantly, a business league can go astray
by engaging in a business for profit or performing particular services for
its members. While these two requirements seem to collapse into the
other factors already discussed, they are independent requirements identified by courts and the regulations. For instance, advertising on behalf of
members will generally be considered to be the performance of a particular service for members and not support that the organization is organized for exempt purposes.223 However, where an organization advertises
broadly on behalf of the industry, there is no particular service being
provided to a member. A commodity and stock exchange created for
members224 and the creation of a laundry business for members are both
examples of prohibited particular services as well as the operation of a
business for profit.225 The IRS has stated that the legal question is whether the activity or service “relieves the member of the necessity of securing the service commercially (or performing the service on an individual
basis) in order to properly conduct the member’s business, resulting in a
convenience or economy to the member.”226
B. Difference Between Tax Exemption/Taxable for Business Leagues?
A business league is generally an incorporated entity.227 Therefore
an exemption from income tax means that it does not have to pay the
corporate income tax.228 The amount of any subsidy provided is equal to
219. Id. at 478, 488.
220. Id. at 482–83 (citations omitted).
221. Bluetooth Sig, Inc. v. United States, No. C05–1778–JCC, 2008 WL 312712, at *7–9
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 2008), aff’d, 611 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2010).
222. Id. at *5.
223. See Auto. Elec. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 168 F.2d 366, 367–68 (6th Cir. 1948); Rev. Rul. 65-14,
1965-1 C.B. 236; Rev. Rul. 64-315, 1964-2 C.B. 147.
224. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)–1 (1960).
225. A–1 Cleaners & Dyers Co. v. Comm’r, 14 B.T.A. 1314, 1314, 1316 (1929).
226. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,411 (Sept. 18, 1985).
227. See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 8, at 115 n.2.
228. Business leagues could simply pay tax as a corporation as Major League Baseball appears
to have done when it gave up its tax-exempt status. See Duff Wilson, N.F.L. Executives Hope to
Keep
Salaries
Secret,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
12,
2008),
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the tax the corporation would have owed. An exempt organization is
broadly responsible for the unrelated business income tax under §§ 511–
514, but it only owes that tax if it incurs unrelated business income.229
The corporate tax is a tax on an organization’s income, i.e., generally
revenue less ordinary and necessary business expenses. In the absence of
tax exemption, there are three primary types of income upon which a
business league might pay tax: (1) net investment income (portfolio income), (2) income from member dues, and (3) income from the sale of
goods and services to members and nonmembers. In each case, to determine income, expenses are offset against the revenue from these activities.
The first type of income and the tax owed is fairly straightforward.
A business league does not pay tax on income from gains from stocks
and bonds, rental income, royalties and other passive investments that are
excluded from Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT).230 Tax exemption for investment income works just like an individual’s pension plan.
Earnings from capital held by the exempt organization are exempt from
tax.231 Such income would generally be taxed at the corporate rate.232 If,
after deductions, a business league earned $1,000 in investment income,
assuming a 36% rate, it would owe $360. Because, unlike most other
corporations, a business league is absolved from this tax, the government
can be seen to provide a subsidy to a business league equal to the tax rate
multiplied by investment income. Here that amount would be $360. The
benefits most likely accrue to the members who control the organization.
The research in Part I(B)(3) would suggest this means that the benefits
flow most to the highest paying members of the organization whose interests the organization most typically follows.
The second type of income, membership income, lacks the clarity
found in net investment income. Many argue, as discussed in the paragraph below, that member dues do not represent income at all, but only
the pooling of resources. Defining membership income requires us to
determine what it means to be a member of a nonprofit organization. A
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/sports/football/12nfltax.html (“Major League Baseball changed
its status last year to a for-profit corporation.”). It could reorganize as a pass-through entity, such as
a partnership or limited liability company, and be taxed under the subchapter K pass-through regime.
Or, a business league could be seen as a cooperative that should be taxed under subchapter T of the
Code. See CHARLES T. AUTRY & ROLAND F. HALL, THE LAW OF COOPERATIVES 91 (2009). A cooperative is an organization that is (1) owned and controlled by the persons who buy or sell its services
or goods, (2) engaged primarily in selling to or buying from those who own it, (3) is democratically
controlled by its members, and (4) works to maximize benefit to its owners rather than to maximize
profits. Id. at 1–2. Cooperatives offer a hybrid taxing regime where the organization is in effect taxed
both as an entity and treated as a conduit such that the members pay tax on the earnings of the entity.
See id. at 90–91, 101.
229. 26 U.S.C. §§ 511–514 (2012).
230. Id. § 512(b).
231. See id. § 501(a), (c)(6).
232. Generally, business leagues are organized as corporate entities. A corporation is taxed
under 26 U.S.C. § 11.
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member pays business league dues because the business league provides
some good or service that the member values at least as much as he paid
in dues. From this perspective, a member is a customer of an entity in
which the member has some part interest. And, if the business league is a
corporate entity separate from its members, which presumably it is, and
the membership dues are not the purchase of shares of stock but the acquisition of goods or services, then any retained earnings from dues
payments at the end of a taxable year represent income from membership
dues. The dues represent the prepayment for goods or services to be received throughout the year. If this is our perspective of a member, the
taxation is not very difficult for our income tax system. The subsidy here
would be the tax rate times the income exempted from tax.
Some conceive of membership dues as simply the pooling of capital
to do something the member could have done without the organization.233 For example, a member might pool capital with other members to
cooperatively advertise their common interest. Thus, some argue that
there is no taxable activity involved in the membership dues situation.234
This view ignores the entity and views the relationship as nothing more
than a conduit. This is a plausible frame through which to view the relationship between member and organization. First, in almost all cases a
member of a business league is engaged in a trade or business and would
be able to deduct the amount of money that the business league ultimately expends.235 Thus, although paying the business league allows the
member an immediate deduction, this is the correct result for the vast
majority of membership dues payments. For those portions that it is the
incorrect result, i.e., the member gets a deduction associated with an
amount that would not have been deductible until some later year, this
aberration results in a tax deferral only rather than complete exemption.236 Likewise, the business league itself would also be able to deduct
most expenditures of the organization at the end of the day. Nevertheless,
this view takes an odd view of the normal view regarding an entity individual relationship. The two are normally treated as separate persons.237
And, even in the case of cooperatives or partnerships, where the entity at
times is ignored, the business league exemption choice ignores both the
entity and the individual level of tax responsibility.
Finally, the third source of income, payments received from conducting a trade or business, may be currently taxed under the Unrelated
Business Income Tax (UBIT) regime or may be exempt as a substantially
related trade or business.238 For instance, if an organization sells a seal of
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

For a discussion of this idea, see Halperin, supra note 9, at 134.
E.g., id. at 139, 155–56.
See, e.g., id. at 135.
Id.
Moline Props. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
26 U.S.C. § 513.
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approval to members and nonmembers and the IRS determines the sale
of that seal is substantially related to the organization’s exempt purpose,
the business league will not owe UBIT on the income from that service.
However, where the business league sells advertising to particular members, the business league will owe the UBIT on this income for that tax
year.
Payments to a tax-exempt business league are not deductible as a
charitable contribution, as are donations to a charitable organization;239
however, most payments to a business league are deductible as a trade or
business expense.240 Membership dues are generally deductible, except to
the extent any amount is used to lobby or intervene in a political campaign.241 From a casual perusal of business league Form 990s it appears
that business leagues do not indicate a large percentage of their expenses
go to either advocating for or against a candidate or for lobbying.242 This
seems odd given the research above suggesting that a primary driver for
the creation of business leagues is in order to lobby. Further research into
this matter might be fruitful.
To see the impact of taxing a business league, consider what would
happen if a business league, call it the American Barbell Association
(ABC), gives up its exemption from tax and chooses to be taxed as a
corporation.243 ABC speaks for the benefit of the barbell industry. It engages in the following transactions. It receives $1,000,000 in dues annually from 1,000 members. It also earns $100,000 in revenue from the sale
of a seal of approval for well-made barbells. Finally, it holds a $500,000
endowment of stocks and bonds upon which it earns a 10% return or
$50,000. Thus, it receives a total of $1,150,000 in revenue. Its deductions
amount to $900,000 for speaking for the industry for the year, $50,000 of
239. Id. § 170(a)(1).
240. Id. § 162(a).
241. Id. § 162(e)(1)(A)–(D).
242. For instance, the US Chamber of Commerce indicates on its 2012 Form 990 that of its
$207 million of expenses, only $13 million was dedicated to lobbying. Chamber of Commerce 2012
Tax Form, I.R.S. Income Tax Form 990, pt. I, l. 18, pt. IX, l. 11(d), [hereinafter 2012 Chamber of
Commerce Form 990], available at http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2012/530/045/2012530045720-09d301b9-9O.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). The American Medical Association reports $0 of lobbying expenses in 2012 when reporting $224 million in total expenses. American
Medical Association 2012 Tax Form, I.R.S. Income Tax Form 990, pt. I. l. 18, pt. IX, l. 11(d), [hereinafter
2012
AMA
Form
990],
available
at
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2012/360/727/2012-360727175-09d9349b-9O.pdf
(last
visited June 23, 2015).
243. In many instances, a business league could choose to be organized as a pass-through
entity or a cooperative and be taxed as such. Major League Baseball for instance chose to become an
LLC and taxed as a partnership when it gave up tax exemption recently. Under partnership taxation,
an organization is treated as an entity by the IRS mostly for accounting purposes but not for tax
purposes. Instead of taxing the entity, the Code imposes a tax on the partners under the Subchapter K
regime. A cooperative provides a hybrid regime. It is incorporated and owes a corporate tax. However, it is allowed to deduct patronage dividends such that any earnings that are distributed to members are not taxed at the corporate level. Subchapter T of the Code would likely apply to most business leagues that chose to be taxed as a cooperative. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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which it reports as lobbying. It spends $90,000 in administering its seal
of approval program. Finally, it incurs $10,000 in deductible expenses in
managing its portfolio. Thus it incurs $1,000,000 in total expenses.
ABC earned $40,000 in our first type of identified income, investment income. If it were tax exempt, it would not owe tax on this money.
ABC’s member income would equal $100,000.244 If it were tax-exempt,
the Association would not owe tax on that amount. Finally, with respect
to our third type of income, ABC earned $10,000 from the sale of the
seal of approval. Assuming an even corporate tax rate of 30%, ABC
would owe $12,000 on its investment income, $30,000 in taxes on member income, and $3,000 in taxes on its trade or business income. It is
possible that even as a tax-exempt entity the Association might owe tax
on trade or business amount. It would depend on how the Association
structured the seal of approval.245 Thus, as a taxable entity, ABC would
pay $45,000 in taxes on $150,000 of income, while as tax exempt it
would pay nothing or $3,000 on that same income.
As a taxable entity, ABC could choose to spend all of its member
dues on expenses and keep its total tax burden to the $15,000 owed on
investment income and sales of services. It could also possibly treat the
excess $100,000 in member dues as a rebate. In other words, ABC could
determine that it charged its members too much and return that money. It
would still pay tax on the remaining $50,000 of investment income and
trade or business income.
The incentive effect therefore of granting tax-exempt status, is to
encourage the tax-exempt organization to not spend its earnings currently; this is because it gets an advantage over others by having retained
earnings that do not face a tax. If the organization is taxable it will be
encouraged to either return money to its members or spend it all currently. Thus, if we have reason to believe that it would be better for business
leagues to spend its income currently we might choose instead to make
them taxable rather than tax exempt.
C. Propriety of Tax Exemption for Business Leagues
Few argue business leagues deserve tax exemption. Those who have
opined from a scholarly perspective describe exemption for these organizations as “rickety.”246 Even though considered rickety, Boris Bittker and
George Rahdert state that it might be self-defeating to tax business
244. I assume the IRS will treat a for-profit business league as if it is in the trade or business of
providing lobbying. Thus, the $50,000 of lobbying expense, while not deductible at the member
level because of 26 U.S.C. § 162(e)(1), would be deductible to the business league under 26 U.S.C. §
162(e)(5).
245. See supra Part II.A.
246. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 357 (1976). See also, David S. Miller, Reforming the
Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 474 (2014).
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leagues.247 They point out that a business league could either be operated
at a break-even point, incurring no taxable obligation, or could pass
along the extra tax charge to its members who would deduct this charge
and substantially lower their total tax obligation.248 Halperin concludes
that tax exemption for business leagues is a subsidy but believes there is
little harm in the subsidy to the extent it is associated with member services.249 Its primary benefit is deferral.250
Thus, the primary arguments for exempting business leagues from
income tax seem to be that taxing them would be a waste of time and an
administrative burden. This Section investigates whether there might be
positive arguments for tax exemption for business leagues. It finds that
there are positive arguments, but ones that are not ultimately satisfactory.
It also concludes that the suggestion that taxing business leagues would
be a waste of time and an administrative burden are incorrect today.
I have argued that mutual-benefit organizations, such as business
leagues, should generally be subject to taxation.251 I argued that under the
shareholder theory of corporate taxation, mutual-benefit organizations
should pay a tax to represent the private gain provided through the operation of the organization. Under corporate tax theories, the most accepted
theory of taxation is that we tax corporate entities to tax the shareholders.252 Because the members of mutual-benefit organizations closely resemble the shareholders of a for-profit corporation—they control the
organization through voting and are the primary beneficiaries of the actions of the organization—a corporate tax should apply to business
leagues and other mutual benefits unless a strong positive case can be
made for their exemption. Public benefit corporations, on the other hand,
such as charitable organizations are structured to have no members who
resemble shareholders. Thus, it is more difficult to make a positive case
for taxation of charitable organizations under the shareholder theory of
corporate taxation.
Consistent with economic theory for government subsidies, and
with the market failure theory, it arguably makes sense to provide exemption to an organization that fulfills an important public purpose.253
The most common argument made for providing an organization exemption from tax is that the organization provides some public benefit that is
at least equal to the amount of tax the organization would have paid (the
“quid pro quo theory”).254 The dominant argument within the quid pro
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 246, at 357.
Id.
Halperin, supra note 9, at 135–36.
Id. at 135.
Hackney, supra note 8, at 118.
Id.
See id. at 125–26, 155.
See, e.g., id. at 125.
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quo theory holds that we provide a subsidy to nonprofit organizations
that solve a market failure.255 Typically, the type of market failure involved is either (1) a good or service that has positive externalities or (2)
a public good. No one has explicitly argued that a business league solves
a market failure. Nevertheless, there are three market failures, or perhaps
government failures, that subsidizing business leagues might solve: (1) it
might foster a pluralist society, (2) it might ensure that needed, useful,
truthful information is delivered to the government, and (3) it might provide a private regulatory authority (think bar association).
Some make a positive argument for tax exemption.256 They argue
tax exemption fosters a pluralist society. By subsidizing the formation of
groups that will advocate for societal interests we enhance our democracy. Encouraging the formation of groups can help to ensure all interests
of our nation are represented before our government, and can bring us
closer to an ideal representative democracy.
This pluralism theory must be based on the assumption that there is
a market failure associated with the collective good of governmental
interest representation. As discussed in Part I above, this is the collective
action problem; although there are many needs of individuals and organizations that could be fulfilled by government, the cost involved in seeking the fulfillment of that need by government is more costly than the
return to any one individual. While it would be in the collective interest
to organize to spread the cost of speaking to the government, the cost of
such organization is often so great compared to the return that some individuals and groups might never organize. Other collective interests might
organize, but might never get the optimal amount of this service because
many individuals and organizations will free ride on the efforts of others.
Thus the basis for this positive case: the subsidy of tax exemption can
encourage the development of organizations that represent diverse important views before the government.257 This can enhance the democratic
nature of government. We might further enhance the power of this claim
by noting that this subsidy is best suited to nonprofit organizations. The
absence of owners who might act opportunistically in a nonprofit means
nonprofits are more trustworthy than a for-profit organization and thus
worthy of the government subsidy.258

255. See, e.g., id. at 126.
256. See, e.g., SALAMON, supra note 12, at 14; Gardner, supra note 12, at xiii–xv.
257. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the “role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply
conflicting, activities and viewpoints”); see also SALAMON, supra note 12, at 14; Gardner, supra
note 12, at xiii–xv.
258. Cf. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV.
2017, 2066–67 (2007) (who argued that we had no reason to believe that nonprofit charitable organizations were more deserving of a subsidy for carrying out charitable works than any other organizations).
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This represents a prescriptive pluralism. It recommends that the
government give aid to organizations that will represent group interests
before the government. The positive externality presumably from such
activity is that the government will be more democratic because it is
more inclusive of the diverse opinions of society.
A related positive case, which I refer to as the information theory, is
also based on the problem of collective action. Under this theory the subsidy encourages the collective action of organizations to provide the government with important, necessary information.259 Neither legislators nor
government employees can know all the information they need to manage the complex regulatory world. In the early 1900s, in fact, there was a
sense that our government should seek out substantial help from these
associational groups to scientifically govern commerce.260 Furthermore,
interest groups possess valuable electoral information for those running
for election.261 It is theoretically possible that interest groups could help
align a politician’s position more closely with the electorate. Thus, business leagues deserve exemption because they fill this important public
role of bringing important, necessary information to the government.
Again, the case for this claim could be augmented if it could be shown
that nonprofits provide better and more truthful information.
Finally, in some cases, some business leagues may serve an important regulatory function. This might be particularly helpful in a circumstance where that function is one that the state might have otherwise
operated. These organizations might provide a lower cost, less intrusive
means of regulating and ensuring the smooth operation of important professional and industry functions. For instance, bar associations regulate
lawyers and many industry associations may regulate the quality of
products provided by a particular industry. As will be seen in the case
studies below, the Cotton Trade Institute tried to serve as the arbiter of
quality products by helping to implement a federal code governing these
products. Also, the AMA has served a regulatory role at times by overseeing the quality of drugs, and is today involved in regulating payment
structures associated with medical procedures.262
In assessing these three related positive cases, the first step is to assess whether there is a market failure that business leagues are solving.
Arguably, the current set of requirements for business leagues that pro259. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 174; see also RAYMOND A. BAUER, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL &
LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY 324–25 (1963) (establishing a
case from the time that the main way that many business interest groups worked in pressuring Congress was really an informational sharing role). A couple authors in fact make an argument that is
consistent with the informational theory; they claim lobbying is a subsidy to the government. Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69
(2006).
260. EISNER, supra note 177, at 5.
261. WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 199.
262. See infra Part III.F.
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hibit an exempt business league from operating for a particular business
aids the case that business leagues provide a collective good that might
be subject to market failure. Instead of helping just Midas Mufflers, any
business league formed around mufflers must help all organizations in
that line of business. However, as developed above in Part I, much of the
business-league community is made up of small homogenous interests
that appear to have little difficulty organizing.263 Thus, even though they
provide a collective good, the type of collective good they provide does
not appear to have the substantial market failure that is imagined in the
theory supporting exemption from income tax.
Nevertheless, collective action theory and the empirical evidence
demonstrates that some business leagues face real collective-action problems. Professional associations and peak associations arguably face some
real challenges. Mancur Olson notes the challenges that professional
associations face in organizing because they typically represent a large
latent interest.264 For instance, a review of the history of the American
Medical Association seems to demonstrate that the AMA experienced
substantial challenges in organizing prior to the turn of the twentieth
century.265 Peak associations too, such as the Chamber of Commerce,
face greater challenges in organizing than the small trade associations.
Peak associations and professional associations perceive that they must
sell selective incentives such as insurance and discounts and offer opportunities to network to attract members.266 Thus, certain sectors of business leagues face market failure. Could this mean that there might be a
partial positive case to be made on this market failure?
Maybe, but we might question the extent of that market failure.
Many professional associations, for instance, work with their states to
establish closed shops that all but eliminate any collective-action problem.267 In order to practice law, for example, you must be a member of
your state bar.268 If individuals are forced to join the organization by state
compulsion, the collective-action problem is solved. This solves the collective-action problem for many of the most powerful professional associations. Thus, despite the objective challenges that professional associations face, the closed shop generally solves the market failure problem
and there is no need for an additional subsidy to solve that problem. Additionally, while peak associations may experience collective action challenges, those challenges are arguably not as intense as some other nonbusiness public interests. Business organizations typically have members
with the skills and resources to organize. And, as demonstrated in Part I
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra Part I.A.
See OLSON, supra note 26, at 144 (1965).
See infra Part III.F.
See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 26, at 133–35.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.

2015]

TAXING THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS

301

above, business interests are well represented before our government
already; under this analysis, the market failure case for these organizations that face a collective action problem becomes suspect as well.
This assessment of the relative level of market failure faced by different types of business leagues suggests that examining the exemption
worthiness of organizational types is not a hard and fast science. Different organizational interests experience market failure over a continuum.
On the side of extreme market failure we might place large and latent
organizational interests, such as the poor, that experience a high degree
of market failure. On the other end where organizational interests face
almost no market failure, we might place trade associations representing
an industry with few members. This continuum suggests that within the
business-league organizational sector, some organizational types might
be identified that are more deserving than others. For example, peak associations appear to face a greater level of market failure than industry
trade associations and may thus be more worthy of exemption.
If we conclude some organizational types within the businessleague sector are more deserving of exemption than others, then we need
to know what baseline to use in measuring whether a class of organizations on the whole should be entitled to exemption from tax. Should all
the organizations that fit within the class suffer significant, severe market
failure? Should you compare organizations within a class, or is the relevant question the degree of severity of market failure as compared to all
other tax-exempt organizations including charitable organizations? Under the current exemption structure for business leagues there are many
trade associations that represent small interests that objectively do not
appear to face any market failure.269 Furthermore when business interests
are compared to the interests of the poor, the collective-action challenge
difference is profound.
It is hard to make an exact judgment, but if we looked at a continuum of nonprofit organizations that face market failure and it went from
only a little failure to a lot of failure, we could expect that the vast majority of business leagues fall on the little failure side. The overwhelming
empirical evidence discussed above that business interests dominate the
interest group field supports this conclusion.270
We could stop the analysis there. If we can conclude that the vast
majority of business leagues do not face market failure in a relative sense
it becomes hard to suggest they need a subsidy to provide the goods or
services we think are helpful. However, to complete the analysis we
should assess whether, if properly targeted to the organizations within
the business league class that does experience market failure, such as
269.
270.

See supra Part I.A & B.
See supra Part I.A & B.
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peak organizations, one of the positive cases for business leagues suggested above could carry the day for exemption. In the following paragraphs I consider the positive cases as they might apply to the organizations in the business league class that are on the more severe side of market failure.
The first case is an argument that the subsidy fosters a more pluralistic society. Could the subsidy for peak business associations be supported on the premise that offering peak associations a subsidy will increase the diversity of opinion brought to our government actors? Given
the overwhelming evidence that business interests dominate the interest
group field, such a claim seems far-fetched. As a result of the existing
substantial bias towards business interests, providing a subsidy to business interests likely distorts the democratic community more towards
these powerful business interests. Thus, even if exemption were provided
solely to peak associations, the objective of pluralism is probably harmed
rather than enhanced. Taking into consideration the evidence that there
are only so many interest groups that can make up an interest group sector,271 we should be doubly concerned about filling the field with interests that already dominate.
The second case, the informational theory, is usually offered as a
reason to not impose restrictions on lobbying generally.272 Interest groups
bring forth important information to legislators and agency decision
makers and we should be inclined to support those activities. Information
from the regulated is an important good in and of itself. However, this
rationale to be used to support exemption depends on finding market
failure. If most business interests organize anyway, it is hard to understand why we need increase the amount of information provided by this
community. Pushing the informational theory to support subsidization of
lobbying seems a push one step too far.
The third positive case to support business-league exemption presents perhaps the best case because it focuses on a very public function.
Under this case, we subsidize the business leagues that perform a public
regulatory function by enacting and enforcing rules to govern a profession or industry’s relationship with the public and with one another. Professional associations like bar associations enforce professional standards; likewise, some trade associations enforce building codes that may
ensure better products for the public. The activity of regulating an important professional or industrial field fulfills a traditional governmental
role, and we as a society generally accept that we should not tax the government itself. In a sense this could fit the lessening the burdens of charitable organizations. Thus, this exemption need not rely on market failure.
271.
272.

See Lowery & Gray, supra note 127.
See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 35, at 174.
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One could justify this case on the basis of the organization fulfilling a
governmental role alone.
The third case does not broadly support business-league exemption.
A small set of business leagues fulfills this public regulatory role. The
strongest objection to this case is the evidence that this type of activity is
really a byproduct of the primary activity of acting as an interest group
on behalf of the industry.273 Thus, these private associations will continue
to pressure government actors to provide a better environment for their
industry as a whole. The fact that these organizations get the state’s imprimatur to regulate the industry or profession simply makes the voice of
these organizations even more powerful. This is seen quite clearly in the
case study below on the development of the AMA and to a certain extent
the Cotton Textile Institute as well. Given that the regulatory function is
a byproduct of business interests, this case should thus fail as well.
Although no positive case supports tax exemption, might we still
choose to exempt the business league from the income tax because (1) it
does not matter whether we tax these organizations or not, and (2) it
would be an administrative burden anyway? Taxing business leagues
would not likely lead to substantial revenue, and it is true that a part of
the subsidy consists of accelerated deductions for members. However,
the casual acceptance of exempting an organization because it will not
likely lead to much revenue seems misguided. It is important that in our
income tax system we keep a narrow list of organizational types entitled
to exemption, as the greater the number of organizations that do not have
to pay tax, the higher the tax rate must be for everyone else. Furthermore,
the federal tax-exempt status is a signal good that provides to its owner
many other valuable benefits. Many states and local authorities grant tax
exemptions to organizations simply because the federal government provides exemption. After a while this can add up to significant money. A
change at the federal level might encourage some states and local governments to lessen other subsidies provided to these undeserving organizations.
Today, it is hard to imagine that it is administratively more convenient to place business leagues into the tax-exempt category rather than
the taxable category. For the organizations, the regulatory environment
has become deeply complex and costly. The Form 990, the informational
return for tax-exempt organizations, demands significant attention and
the organization must manage to steer clear through an increasingly more
complex tax-exempt regulatory landscape.
As for the administrative burden of the IRS, the resources of the
IRS in its exempt organization division are inadequate to accomplish its
273. Hansen, supra note 36 (“Interest groups’ service organizations quite ironically are byproducts of their lobbying organizations, not the other way around.”).
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current level of work.274 Also, recent experience at the IRS suggests that
the IRS is not a good agency to task with making political decisions.275
The IRS faced serious political trouble for examining whether certain
conservative organizations applying to be exempt as § 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations were engaged in too much politics.276 Business
leagues, like social welfare organizations, may similarly not primarily
advocate for candidates.277 Thus, the rules regarding these organizations
put the IRS in a bad position politically. If they enforce the requirement,
the IRS can do damage to its reputation. If the IRS does not enforce the
requirement, it can do damage to its reputation as well. Eliminating business-league tax exemption would reduce the number of situations in
which the IRS is in significant political danger. Eliminating the necessity
of the IRS in making that political call would remove one problematic
law that it must enforce.
Finally, as noted above, there are some who contend that business
leagues simply pool assets.278 Members of a business league are simply
collectively providing services each member could provide on their own;
business leagues should therefore not be subject to extra tax on individual activity.279 This argument seems to be based on a claim that the trade
associations are nothing more than a conduit. The argument assumes that
the organization should bear no tax because there is no realization event
when a member pays dues and a business league provides a service. A
member is simply putting his money in another pocket.
The first difficulty with this assertion is that it would only apply to
the charge for member dues. Investment income and income from the
sale of services to nonmembers would not be sheltered under this idea.
No member could avoid a tax on that income. However, tax exemption
for business leagues treats both these forms of income as exempt.
As to the question of member dues, a review of the collective action
literature establishes the importance and political usefulness of the collective activity in and of itself. The importance of carrying out businessleague activity in a collective sense makes it hard to conclude that business leagues are simply engaging in activities that the members could
perform on their own. The very purpose of collective action is to accomplish goals that individual members could not accomplish on their own.
Some scholars following a similar thread to the pooling claim note
that if the organization had to pay tax on its retained earnings it might
274. See Philip T. Hackney, Should the IRS Never “Target” Taxpayers: A Review of the IRS
Tea Party Affair, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 134.
279. Id. at 134–36; see also Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 248, at 357.
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simply zero out its income every year.280 A business league could for
instance issue a refund to its members on the premise that it charged too
much earlier in the year. Effectively, this is the argument that it is administratively convenient to treat business-league activity as tax-exempt. The
administratively efficient claim has already been handled above. However, I believe there would be no harm in encouraging these organizations
to spend currently. It would ensure that the organization was not building
up a war chest to fight future battles aided in part from a subsidy from
the government.
D. Concluding Thoughts
Ending tax exemption for these powerful organizations may be politically impossible. A second best option would be to maintain tax exemption but to impose a net investment income tax as is already imposed
on other mutual-benefit nonprofit organizations, such as the social club
under § 501(c)(7) and the political organization under § 527. This would
mean that of the three types of income, only net investment income
would be taxed. Thus, while not perfect, it would be a move to slightly
reduce the subsidy to business leagues. The Clinton administration proposed this move in the late 1990s, but it was unsuccessful.281 One additional positive aspect of this move would be that it would maintain a
right to public disclosure of business-league activities.282 We as a society
might value that public disclosure via the Form 990 more than the taxes
derived from member income or commercial income. Additionally, this
move could even one day support a right to obtain disclosure regarding
donors for political purposes based on the provision of a subsidy. This
could aid in ensuring that the information provided by business leagues
is more truthful and thus helpful to legislators and agencies.283 Thus, the
strongest argument for maintaining exempt status might be to use that
grant as a means to obtain greater information from these organizations.
What implications might this review have for other tax-exempt organizations beyond business leagues? It has little implication for the
charitable sector because charitable organizations are expressly prohibited from intervening in political campaigns and may only do modest
amounts of lobbying.284 In other words, while charitable organizations
may act as interest groups at times, their ability to do so is quite limited.
280.
281.

Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 248, at 357.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL, at 278–81
(Comm. Print 1999); see also Jacob M. Schlesinger, Clinton Plan to Tax Lobbyists’ Investment
Gains Hits Home in a Fury of Faxes, Letters, Web Sites, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1999, at A24.
282. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2) (2012).
283. See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal
Revenue Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1274 (1993) (arguing for
improving the lobbying regulatory regime to encourage “educational advocacy”).
284. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
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This analysis in fact could support these lobbying and electoral limitations in part. The analysis should be quite relevant to other mutualbenefit organizations that participate substantially in the political process. Namely, the analysis has ramifications for both social welfare organizations,285 and labor and agricultural organizations,286 both of which
typically act in a primary capacity as interest groups. The analysis calls
exemption for these organizations into question as well on a presumption
that the law gives a subsidy to many of the wrong groups that would
have organized whether tax exemption existed or not. One could consider whether exemption is warranted where a certain segment of society,
such as the poor, or labor interests, face more severe collective action
problems, and suffer significant political voice inequality as a result.287
This question is beyond the scope of this Article, but I plan to turn to
these questions in a later article.
III. THE BUSINESS OF BUSINESS LEAGUES: THREE CASE STUDIES
This Part describes the three main types of business leagues and uses three case studies to illustrate their activities. This is offered to provide more context regarding business leagues and to promote a larger
understanding of their activities within the legal literature as it relates to
taxation. Additionally, it provides an opportunity to test some of the ideas expressed above.
There are no groups that are more engaged in the pressure group
business than business interests.288 However, in addition to lobbying,
business leagues collect statistics, standardize processes, institute uniform cost accounting, settle trade disputes, and establish codes of ethics.289 Business leagues also work to “stabilize” the market, including
sometimes engaging in price fixing.290 Typically, the most significant
activity of a business league is as a liaison for the particular business
interest to Congress or state and local governments.291
Business leagues fall into three main categories: (1) peak organizations (think highly generalized business organizations such as the United
States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), and the National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB)); (2) specific industry trade associations
(think the National Beer Wholesalers Association, the Motion Picture
Association of America, and the National Council of Textile Organizations); and, (3) professional associations (think bar associations and med285. Id. § 501(c)(4).
286. Id. § 501(c)(5).
287. SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 105, at 312–27, 344–46.
288. See, e.g., E. PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS 78
(1929).
289. Id. at 98.
290. See, e.g., LOUIS GALAMBOS, COMPETITION & COOPERATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A
NATIONAL TRADE ASSOCIATION 3–10 (1966).
291. HERRING, supra note 291, at 98.
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ical associations that implement and monitor state-backed licensing systems and establish minimum education requirements). Each of these different types of business leagues provides some other service in addition
to political influence, but all share the commonality of attempts to influence governmental policy, i.e., they are interest groups.
A. Peak Organizations
Peak organizations are made up of diverse interests from every
spectrum and size of business. Their primary function tends to be to protect and enhance their members’ interests before the federal government.292 In addition to representation, peak organizations provide some
other selective and purposive incentives to their members, such as discounts on products, subscriptions to publications, and opportunities to
network. The Chamber, founded in 1912 at the behest of President
Taft,293 is probably the best known peak organization. In its early iteration, the leaders of the Chamber saw that its most important function was
to obtain “the matured judgment of business on national questions and to
present and interpret these views to the agencies of government and to
the public.”294 Its members include both individuals and entities. It includes for-profit and nonprofit businesses in its membership.
The Chamber, like most peak organizations, only takes a position
on an issue when it has a supermajority of its membership interested in
and agreed upon that issue.295 It cautiously avoids particularistic issues
that are of interest to only parts of its membership and lets corporations
and trade associations fight these battles instead.296 The Chamber says its
members “count on the Chamber to be their voice in Washington,
D.C.”297 Of all the different types of business leagues, the peak organizations appear to suffer the greatest collective-action problems likely because of the lack of homogeneity of interest—the prime commonality of
the peak organization is the interest in business in general.
1. National Federation of Independent Business
The formation and operation of the NFIB is an excellent example of
the purposes and activities of a peak organization.298 Its formation story

292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra Part I.
TRUMAN, supra note 48, at 85.
HERRING, supra note 291, at 86 (internal quotation mark omitted).
MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION,
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY 41 (2000).
296. Id.
297. About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
https://www.uschamber.com/about-us-chamber-commerce (last visited June 23, 2015).
298. McGee Young, Advocacy Innovation and Political Opportunity: Assessing the Rise of the
NFIB, Address Prepared for the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
2–3
(Aug.
28–31,
2003),
available
at
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fits Salisbury’s exchange theory of interest group formation well.299
Founded by an entrepreneur, its salesmen hawked memberships to small
businesses around the country.300 It primarily sold purposive incentives.
Consistent with the suggestion of Olson, we see that the NFIB as a peak
association appeared to face a real collective-action problem.
The NFIB is today an organization of approximately 350,000 members.301 It reported revenue of $103 million and expenses of $100 million
in 2012.302 Its mission is “to organize the independent or small business
men into an association to the end that his voice may be heard effectively
in local, state, and national affairs affecting small business.”303 It vigorously engages with the political process. For example, it helped Republicans to victory in the mid 1990s and helped to stymie Bill Clinton’s
health reform.304 Most recently, it tried to stop the Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act.305
C. Wilson Harder founded the NFIB in 1943 in the San Francisco
Bay area.306 Harder, a small business owner active in the Chamber,
formed the NFIB in response to frustration that the Chamber represented
the interests of large businessmen rather than small businessmen.307
World War II imposed challenges on businesses by increasing demand
for their services while also depleting the labor force. During the war,
after prodding by the Chamber, the government implemented rules that
Harder believed helped large businesses at the expense of the small businesses.308 Harder took umbrage at unfair trade practices and issues of
distribution that he believed these rules protected and encouraged. Harder believed the government implemented these rules because the small
businessman lacked a sufficient voice in Congress.309
To make the NFIB work, Harder believed he needed a strong sales
model; but he made a decision to only seek members from independent

1.php. Much of the information for this case study on the NFIB comes from McGee Young’s examination of the NFIB.
299. See Part I.B.2.
300. See id. at 7.
301. Members of Congress Honored as Guardians of Small Business by NFIB, NAT’L FED’N
OF INDEP. BUS. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.nfib.com/article/?cmsid=60967.
302. National Federation on Independent Business 2012 Tax Form, I.R.S. Income Tax Form
990, pt. I, ll. 12, 18, [hereinafter 2012 NFIB Form 990], available at
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2012/940/707/2012-940707299-097ff0c2-9O.pdf
(last
visited June 23, 2015).
303. National Federation of Independent Business Inc. Mission Statement, GUIDESTAR,
http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/94-0707299/national-federation-independent-business.aspx
(last visited June 23, 2015).
304. Young, supra note 301, at 3.
305. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
306. Young, supra note 301, at 3.
307. Id. at 4.
308. Id.
309. Id.

2015]

TAXING THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS

309

businesses that did not dominate a field.310 He sold small businessmen
the right to effective representation in Washington D.C. In addition to
representation before Congress, the NFIB provided a newsletter to its
members called the Mandate.311 With one lobbyist in Washington, Harder kept a lean policy staff but employed a large sales force that extended
over 200 districts across the country.312 Entitled to a 50% commission on
first year dues, the sales force, not unsurprisingly, aggressively recruited
members.313
The sales force recruited members using the anger harbored by
many smaller businessmen toward the government from post-New Deal
programs that privileged large firms over small.314 In the opinion of
many small businessmen, the large firms set all industry-wide codes and
those codes were set intentionally to assist large industry to the detriment
of independent business.315 To sell NFIB membership, salesmen would
bring a copy of the newsletter Mandate to the small businessmen they
visited.316 The Mandate conducted a monthly poll of its members on an
issue important to small businessmen.317 In the poll it provided the members the pros and cons on the issue that it was polling.318 The organization would then share the results of these polls with congressmen to attempt to sway them.319 While this model was successful at enrolling
members, the NFIB experienced a high membership turnover rate. 320
Harder focused on sales, while the NFIB lobbyist represented the
organization in Washington D.C.321 The lobbyist, George Burger, had a
strong connection to the National Association of Independent Tire Dealers.322 Burger pushed the NFIB to advocate the issues that concerned
independent tire dealers—namely issues surrounding an anti-monopoly
position.323 Burger ignored opportunities for war contracts for small
businessmen, and problems with the consolidation of small manufacturers.324
The NFIB developed a model of influence based on providing effective polling of constituents.325 The evidence, however, does not show
310.
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that the effort had tremendous impact on legislation. Even the small
business legislation that was passed, the Small Business Act of 1953
(SBA), did not have the backing of NFIB.326 Although the SBA did specify a pro-small-businessman policy, the NFIB strongly preferred that
small businessmen be able to appeal directly to Congress rather than
have to work through a governmental agency to influence policy. Nevertheless, Congress established the Small Business Administration anyway.327 This happened in spite of some opposition from the small business lobby.328 Because the NFIB had little interest in the bill, the bill
ended up being drafted to satisfy the interests of members of Congress
rather than the interests of the members of the NFIB.329 In the 1980s the
NFIB helped to dismantle the program.330
With the death of Harder in 1968, the organization changed its lobbying efforts.331 It instituted systems to keep track of congress members’
votes and conspicuously recognized those members who supported the
organization’s positions.332 The NFIB showed its strength in the early
1990s in the battle over President Clinton’s planned health care overhaul.333 Knowing that they had most Republican’s on board, the NFIB
went after Democrats in their districts. They hosted meetings in the districts of the targeted Democrats to put them on the spot regarding how
they would vote on healthcare.334 The NFIB quickly won the support of
Max Baucus, an influential Democratic senator from Montana.335 They
managed to be one of the main groups to have stopped the Clinton health
plan momentum.336 They did this by applying local pressure to targeted
congressmen.
The NFIB quickly became, and appears to continue to be, closely
aligned with the Republican Party. The NFIB recruits candidates, funds
candidates, and encourages its members to vote for these candidates on
an election day.337 It continues to rely on a strong sales effort to attract
members but also sells some selective incentives, such as insurance, financial services deals, and human resources support.338 It appears,
though, to rely heavily on the sale of purposive incentives. Judging from
its continued partisan stance, such as being the primary plaintiff in the
326. Id. at 11.
327. Id. at 11–13.
328. Id. at 11.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 15.
331. Id. at 16.
332. Id. at 17.
333. Id. at 24–28.
334. Id. at 25–26.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 27.
337. Id. at 29.
338. See Member Vantage, NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. BUS., http://www.nfib.com/membervantage/ (last visited June 23, 2015).
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major case against Obamacare,339 its members appear to join because of
the strong free-market stance they see the organization take.
The NFIB raised $86 million of its $103 million in revenue in 2012
from membership fees.340 It has historically earned most of its money
through these membership fees.341 Until 2010 its largest single donation
from a group outside its membership was $21,000.342 In 2010, though,
and the years following, it received larger contributions such as a $3.7
million contribution from Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS.343 The NFIB
also earned about $2 million in investment income and around $5 million
from a combination of advertising, affiliate management income, and
sponsorship income.344 Presumably some of these amounts are from the
various products and services, i.e., selective incentives, the NFIB makes
available on its website such as discounts on business and financial services, insurance, and HR support for its members.345 In 2012 the NFIB
acknowledged $65,000 in political expenditures to support candidates,
and spent $44 million of its $100 million to lobby Congress and other
legislative bodies.346
The following is an extremely rough, non-scientific, attempt at determining whether the NFIB has solved its collective-action problem.
The Small Business Administration estimates that there are 23 million
small businesses in the United States347 and the NFIB counts around
350,000 members. If we made a likely incorrect assumption that none of
those 350,000 members represented double counting for any business,
then NFIB enrolled about 1.5% of its potential audience.348 This could
suggest that the NFIB faces a real collective-action problem. Perhaps
though, it is possible to view the NFIB’s audience differently than all
small businesses. Unlike the Chamber, the NFIB adopts a strident political stance; thus, the NFIB’s potential members are drawn from a much
smaller set. Given the strident stance, it is possible that the total possible
audience that the NFIB appeals to is some smaller fraction of those 23
million small businesses. Some estimate that obtaining more than 5% of
a relevant group suggests the collective-action problem has been
339.
340.
341.
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solved.349 If it turned out that the NFIB only appealed to 25% of the
small business audience, this would represent 6% of the desired audience. Determining whether an organization has solved a collective-action
problem depends on the group you determine it is trying to appeal to. In
any case, it has been quite successful as a peak association at raising
money and accomplishing some real results with its 350,000 members.
B. Trade Associations
Trade associations represent the interests of the owners and managers of industries like car manufacturers or textile mills. In addition to
organizing to minimize competition in their line of business, industry
players form trade associations to lobby government for beneficial laws
and to stop the government from harming industry interests. Just like
peak associations, trade associations formed in greatest numbers during
times of legislative change and during war. In the case study below you
will see the cotton trade organizing to fight labor laws it found harmful
to industry interests. Additionally they formed to obtain government assistance to scientifically manage the output of the industry to reduce
what they perceived as harmful competition.
In 1921 Emmett Naylor reported that there were about 1,000 trade
associations in the United States.350 They have grown significantly since
that time, although an exact number is hard to obtain. We have IRS data
on the total number of business leagues, but we do not have a breakdown
of how many trade associations there are within that group. In 2012 the
IRS indicated that there were around 64,000 total business leagues registered with the IRS.351
1. Cotton Textile Institute
Louis Galambos provides a case study on the formation, activity,
and maintenance of a national trade association by tracing the origins of
the Cotton Textile Institute.352 The overwhelming message is that trade
associations form to stabilize the business of the current industry players.
Northern and southern cotton firms competed mightily in the late 1800s
and the industry players saw this competition as disastrous to the industry. While the industry appears never to have been successful in stabilizing, its organizing effort led to some fairly significant lobbying success.
The Cotton Textile Institute began with loose associations at a regional level. Three organizations, two in the northeast and one in the
349.
350.
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south, stand out: the New England Cotton Manufacturers Association
and the Arkwright Club in the northeast, and the Southern Cotton Spinners Association in the south.353
The New England Cotton Manufacturers Association was the first
to form in 1865 in the wake of the Civil War as the cotton industry faced
significant technological change and increase in demand.354 Mill agents
sought an opportunity to commune with other agents to stay on top of
rapidly changing technological developments.355 Starting with forty
agents in 1865, the organization grew to almost 500 individual members
in twenty different states, including the north and the south.356 It contained almost all of the mills in New England.357 Until the late 1800s it
operated with almost no staff and little money.358 For those forty years it
primarily operated as a gathering place of cotton mill operators seeking
to share technological information at formally arranged dinners and conferences.359 In the 1890s, some members sought to use the Association as
the political voice of the mills, but this effort was shot down.360
Only the leading mill manufacturers formed the Arkwright Club in
1880.361 These manufacturers intended to engage in “concerted action” to
protect the interests of the mills.362 The leading cause of the formation of
the Club appears to be legislation in Massachusetts limiting the work
hours of women and children.363 The Arkwright started with a limit of
fifty members who had to be officers; it grew to 114 members by
1900.364 The Arkwright was well financed by members who came primarily from the older, larger, more established mills.365 It imposed a
charge on the payroll amount of member mills, which allowed the Arkwright to develop a professional staff by the 1890s.366 Its primary purpose was to lobby.367
Over dinner, Arkwright members would determine the position they
should take on state or federal legislation.368 Members themselves handled most of the lobbying; the Arkwright at this time would only occasionally hire an agent to lobby on its behalf.369 In addition to lobbying,
353.
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the members attempted to stabilize prices in the industry by establishing
“curtailment programs” and sharing price lists.370
The southern organization was later to organize; the cotton textile
industry began in the northeast and only later moved to the south.371 Although loose affiliations formed from time to time in the south, they typically folded quickly.372 In 1897, with anemic participation, forty cotton
manufacturers from the south formed the Southern Cotton Spinners Association.373 Made up of any officer of a mill, the organization accepted
individual members rather than corporate memberships and thus did not
have the money of an Arkwright.374 The southern group focused on stabilizing the industry through price control and product control.375
Galambos refers to this period as the “dinner-club” period of trade
associations.376 The primary form of organization were loosely knit
groups that met over dinner to discuss shared issues and ideas that members wanted to promote within the industry, and sometimes in a more
public sense.377 Trade associations did not become sophisticated professional, staff-operated associations until the next century. In the early
1900s this movement began as the northern mills began to experience the
intense competition from the southern mills.378 Although World War I
stymied competition a little because of increased opportunity for the
trade, after the war the competition made the northern mill operations
look dire. In a new twentieth century vision of industry cooperation the
mills developed “stability, teamwork, and systematic controls” by working together through these associational structures 379
Cotton textile associations also worked to counter the success of the
progressive movement on the labor and regulatory front. In the early
1900s the progressive movement achieved some success in opening government to public pressure.380 New regulatory agencies such as the Food
and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission also made it
necessary for business to have a larger infrastructure with skilled individuals capable of communicating to a sophisticated bureaucratic structure.381 To respond to these new forces, the cotton textile industry created
a service association with the professional staff. The Arkwright Club and
the New England Association both expanded and created divisions to
370.
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handle new needed functions; these included: dispute resolution, classification of products, gathering of statistics, and legislative relations382 By
1913, the organizations were able to form an interregional group to represent the entire industry.383
During the First World War the government worked hard to organize the mills. The government used the associations to coordinate the war
effort.384 Herbert Hoover, head of the Department of Commerce at the
time, strongly encouraged the efforts of trade associations to stabilize
industry through standardization of products, and to cooperate on cost
accounting methods, all in order to improve efficiency.385 However, even
with government help, the cotton textile mills could not cooperate to fix
prices or limit production.386 The southern mills had a significant labor
cost advantage and were unwilling to engage with the larger cotton textile mills.387
In the mid 1920s the industry went into a depression; this financial
crisis led to the formation of the Cotton Textile Institute (CTI), a national
organization with substantial resources. The formation of this organization was made possible by changes at the executive and judicial levels of
government. Many policymakers, such as Herbert Hoover, believed
strongly in the need to liberalize the US policy on antitrust.388 Additionally, in the 1920s a couple decisions of the Court liberalized anti-trust
policy and finally provided industry leeway to coordinate action and
prices.389 These changes in ideology regarding competition at the executive and judicial level allowed the cotton textile sector to feel freer to
seek cooperation from both the mills of the south and the north. In order
to get the backing of the federal government, the mill owners agreed that
this new national organization would not seek to influence legislation.390
The CTI was founded in October 1926 to establish an open price plan in
order to avoid producing excess capacity.391
While today many may harbor concerns regarding price fixing, or
even open price plans, it is interesting to consider the ingredients that the
CTI used to accomplish these goals. These ingredients are still a major
part of trade association work today. To accomplish the open price plan
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the CTI had to standardize cost accounting techniques.392 They had to
normalize the sharing of information and the coordination of product
lines.393 These activities all helped to naturally ease the worst problems
of excess capacity because the members now were freely sharing information using a common language.394 A further implication though was
that “The association programs were created to preserve an existing industrial structure which included, most prominently, the organization’s
members.”395 In other words, this trade association worked to preserve in
place the members of the association, and to either maintain or increase
their respective market share. It is likely that most business leagues work
towards some similar effort.
Even with significant pressure from CTI and the government during
the Depression, the mills could not cooperate to fix prices.396 CTI did
achieve success, however, as the central mouthpiece of the cotton manufacturing trade. The Institute’s leaders came to be respected voices of the
industry, particularly before the government.397 CTI was particularly
successful in persuading Congress to pass the constitutionally ill-fated
National Industrial Recovery Act. 398 As Galambos says, “voluntarism
was being replaced by majority control with coercion of the recalcitrant
minority.”399 CTI formed a committee under authority of the Recovery
Act to draft a code to govern the cotton textile industry. Cotton manufacturers took a command of their industry and became its main voice.400
However, the Court struck down the Recovery Act that had provided the
support for the development of an industry code with the backing of the
government, in 1935, and the industry had to go back to its normal associative activity.401
CTI no longer exists. It appears that the modern day representative
of CTI is the National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO) through
a circuitous route of a somewhat dying US industry.402 In the 1940s, CTI
primarily represented the northern mills; it joined forces with the Cotton
Manufacturer’s Association, representing mostly southern mills to form
the American Cotton Manufacturer’s Institute (ACMI).403 ACMI
changed its name in 1962 to the American Textile Manufacturer’s Institute (ATMI) to recognize the reality of competing synthetic fabrics par392. Id. at 106.
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402. See Aminul Haque, Textile Organizations, TEXTILE TERMINAL (Mar. 16, 2013, 8:13 PM),
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ticularly from foreign markets.404 The new organization worked to protect the American industry from foreign competitors, but it appears that
these efforts were generally unsuccessful.405
On April 1, 2013, the ATMI merged with two other trade associations from other parts of the textile industry to form the NCTO.406 The
NCTO is small, with a little less than $2 million in revenue. It describes
its current mission as being the representative of the textile industry.407
“From fibers to finished products, from machinery manufacturers to
power suppliers, NCTO is the voice of the U.S. textile industry,” and
seeks “to advance the interests of the U.S. textile sector” on an international stage.408
This history of CTI shows at once the challenges of forming and
maintaining a trade association, but also the incipient nature of such associations as a result of the availability of readily identifiable players, the
resources to organize, and a strong identification of goals. War efforts
tend to make the U.S. government feel dependent upon such organizations; this dependency provides trade associations extra force in their
organizing effort. The government will provide assistance to ensure these
organizations are able to form. The cotton trade associations were able to
regularly organize well over a majority of the industry and had particularly easy success on the issue of organizing to speak for the industry in
front of government. Interestingly in comparison to the NFIB, the Cotton
Textile Institute mounted a strong effort against anti-trust policy, while
the NFIB, expressly created for small businessmen, pushed exactly the
other way.
C. Professional Associations
Professional associations represent groups such as lawyers, doctors,
scientists, architects, historians, engineers, and the specialty groups associated with such professions.409 In general, the professions require a certain prescribed course of education that the association establishes; professional associations typically require a college degree.410 Like business
leagues in general, professional associations come in the form of peak
associations as well as regional and specialty associations.
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This section examines the American Medical Association (AMA). It
is one of the oldest professional associations in the United States and has
managed to amass a large percentage of the doctors of the United States
into its membership. Approximately 15% of all doctors belonged to the
AMA in 2011, down from 75% in the early 1950s.411 It has been studied
from many different angles, especially in Paul Starr’s, The Social Transformation of American Medicine.412 The AMA states that its mission is to
“promote the art and science of medicine and the betterment of public
health.”413
1. American Medical Association
State-based medical societies began forming in the late 1700s contemporaneously with the formation of medical schools.414 State societies
worked to elevate their profession by instituting licensing mechanisms
and required education.415 Nathan Smith Davis, a leader in the New York
Medical Society, helped organize the AMA in 1847.416
The New York Medical Society felt the need for a national organization because it was considering adopting new standards to apply to
New York medical schools.417 The New York medical schools feared
that if national standards were not raised, their new standards would be
for naught.418 If New York were to put more stringent standards on its
students, but the rest of the country’s medical societies failed to act in
this way, it was believed that students would largely leave the New York
medical education institutions.419 To further this motivation, in its first
acts, the AMA established standards for medical education and drafted a
medical code of ethics.420 In 1849 the AMA established a board to “analyze quack remedies” and to educate the public about such matters.421 It
founded the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1883, which
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for a long time was the AMA’s chief moneymaker and perhaps chief
reason for joining the AMA.422
The founders of medical societies in the nineteenth century were
neither the elite doctors, who had nothing to fear from “quacks,” nor the
hacks at the very bottom of the medical profession, who rightly feared no
longer being able to practice their craft, but those folks in the middle who
wanted to establish some distinction between themselves and the quacks
and the hacks.423 Starr notes that while the AMA was successful in organizing, the AMA was generally unsuccessful in its first half century in
its primary goal of implementing a licensing regime to exclude certain
physicians from entry into the profession.424 Because the AMA was not
successful during this period in enacting these licensing schemes, it was
difficult to achieve significant membership.425 Additionally, the members
of the medical profession did not need capital or hospitals to practice
their craft so there were not significant pressure points the AMA could
use to force membership.426
As in the case of cotton interests, the AMA began achieving organizing success at the turn of the twentieth century. By 1900, while the
AMA had persuaded states to adopt licensing regimes, it still only had
8,000 members, which amounted to about 8% of all doctors at that
time.427 By contrast, 33,000 doctors belonged to the state medical societies and another 77,000 belonged to no society.428
The AMA modified its membership and organizational structure at
the turn of the century from a member-driven organization to one controlled by the state medical societies. In 1901, the AMA adopted new
rules creating its house of delegates that still exists today.429 The state
medical societies elect representatives to serve on this policy making
body of the AMA.430 The move from direct democracy to representative
democracy allowed the state societies to exercise greater control of the
national organization.431 This change was tremendously effective for
both the state societies and the AMA. State societies experienced huge
increases in membership from 1902 to 1904.432
With these significant successes in hand, the AMA turned to medical education. The doctors of the AMA still believed there were too
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432. Id. For example the membership in Ohio went from 992 to 2640, and in Tennessee from
386 to 1,097.
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many doctors.433 While medical education became more rigorous in the
late nineteenth century,434 medical schools continued to form and the
number of doctors practicing medicine increased at a rate faster than the
AMA desired.435 The AMA directly attacked this problem by reducing
the number of medical schools. In 1904, the AMA created a Council on
Medical Education which immediately imposed more rigorous requirements on medical schools.436 The AMA required that to enter medical
school, a student needed four years of high school.437 Further, to graduate
from medical school, a medical student needed four years of medical
education and was required to pass a licensing test.438 Finally, the AMA
began to inspect medical schools to ensure accord with these new requirements.439
The changes altered the economics of medical education. The number of medical schools decreased from 162 to 131 in four years (i.e., by
1910) and decreased to 95 by 1915.440 Most fundamentally though, the
AMA made a cultural change in who trained new doctors. Instead of
practicing doctors training new doctors, scientists and researchers took
over this role.441 These changes caused a tremendous homogenization in
the social makeup of doctors, and while women had been going to medical schools, it now pushed them away.442 The new requirements shut
down five of seven medical schools that trained black students.443 Finally, these changes reduced access to doctors in rural and poor areas.444
Closing the ranks of the profession was not the sole goal of the
AMA. It also saw patent drug makers as a competitor as well.445 By joining forces with muckraking journalists, the AMA managed to significantly alter the drug business to the benefit of doctors.446 After the turn of the
century, with political pressure, the AMA helped to pass the Pure Food
and Drug Act regulating acceptable food and drugs.447 The AMA established the Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry to test drugs in its own
laboratory to enforce the new law itself.448 This began a shift in the sale
of drugs in the United States—instead of a drug company selling drugs
433. Id. at 112.
434. Id. at 115.
435. Id. at 112.
436. Id. at 117.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 118.
440. Id. at 118, 120.
441. Id. at 123.
442. Id. at 124.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 125.
445. Id. at 127.
446. Id. at 129.
447. Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938); STARR, supra note
415, at 131.
448. STARR, supra note 415, at 129, 131.
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directly to the public, the drug companies began to sell drugs through
physicians.449 “This strategic gatekeeping role permitted the AMA, in
effect, to levy an advertising toll on the producers.”450
These legislative forays that generated power for the medical profession over matters related to the medical business were effective for
doctors. Doctor income grew twice as fast as the rest of the economy
from the turn of the century to about 1928.451 Additionally, the social
status of doctors increased tremendously.452 Thus unlike the cotton trade
manufacturers, who perhaps had an easier time organizing, the doctors
appear to have achieved greater success in the price stabilization game,
and in fact, in the increasing price game.
Twenty trustees govern the AMA today.453 Its House of Delegates
still acts as its policy making body.454 The delegates come from medical
associations (state or territorial), national medical specialty organizations, professional interest medical associations, the five federal services,
and several of the AMA’s member sections and groups.455 There are over
500 voting members of the governing body; many other members are
allowed to observe twice annually held meetings.456 The AMA also operates seven councils that develop and share expertise on issues of ethics,
science, and medical education.457
The AMA offers a variety of selective incentives to members, and
also some incentives that appear to have a compulsory nature. It sells
regulatory administrative help, insurance, legal assistance, education, and
information.458 More significantly, it controls an important code called
the Current Procedural Technology code (CPT Code) that determines
how any medical procedure is reimbursed by Medicare, and consequently other insurers.459 The AMA made about 28% of its revenue from the
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457. Our People, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/ourpeople.page? (last visited June 23, 2015).
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Without Representation: Is it Time for a “CPT Party” Revolt?, THE INTEGRATOR BLOG (Oct. 20,
2010), http://theintegratorblog.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=701&Itemid=1.
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CPT code in 2012.460 In order to practice in the health field today, a medical practitioner or medical entity must purchase the rights to this Code.
The AMA makes almost twice as much off its operation of the CPT
Code as it does from membership revenue.461
According to its 2012 Form 990 the AMA earned almost $250 million in revenue.462 Approximately $39 million came from membership
fees.463 It earned another $56 million from what it refers to as subscriptions and also from items such as credentialing services, educational programs and graduate medical programs.464 It earned about $10 million
through investment income and another $70 million from royalty income
(the income from the CPT Code).465 The AMA earned another $8 million
from the sale of securities and earned a little over a million from rental of
property.466 Finally the sale of inventory brought the AMA $32 million,
while the advertising brought in $19 million.467
AMA revenue exceeded expenses by about $15 million in 2012.468
Its revenues exceeded expenses by $21 million in 2011.469 It reports that
at the end of 2012 it had net assets of $385 million.470 It reported to the
IRS that it spent about $16 million on lobbying.471 According to OpenSecrets.org the AMA was one of the largest lobbying spenders in 2013.472
In the 113th Congress, the AMA lobbied on over sixty different bills
including on matters such as the Medicare Patient Empowerment Act of
2013, Protecting Seniors’ Access to Medicare Act of 2013, and the
SKILLS Visa Act.473
D. Case Study Conclusion
This section demonstrated the idiosyncratic and in part historical nature of different types of business leagues that have formed, but also
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demonstrates the incipient nature of the organizations of well-defined
business interests. Notably, each of the organizations studied is, at heart,
an interest group seeking to influence the governmental process. A
strong anti-market and protectionist flavor imbues both the trade associations and the professional associations. Some peak organizations, like
the NFIB oppose this big business perspective. Finally, we see the readily identifiable finite groups that business leagues represent. These business interests possess the skilled individuals and well structured organizations that allow business interest to organize efficiently and effectively.
Furthermore, the government often provides support and power to these
organizations and relies on them to support various government interests.
Most importantly perhaps for purposes of this Article each of these
organizations would have formed with or without the subsidy of exemption. We should thus expect as argued above that the subsidy of exemption brings more of these organizations into existence leading to some
oversupply of a good or service that is already provided in sufficient
quantity.
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrated that the organizations we exempt from
income tax under § 501(c)(6) are first and foremost interest groups.
Business leagues seek to obtain goods and services from the government
that can be helpful to their membership. Because tax exemption for these
mutual-benefit organizations is a subsidy, we should want to justify this
treatment. The predominant theory of tax exemption holds that tax exemption provides a subsidy to aid the formation of groups that provide
public goods or goods subject to market failure. While business leagues
do provide certain public goods, and some business leagues face a collective action challenge, these organizations are not subject to the depth of a
collective-action problem as are other groups, such as the poor. Tax exemption for business leagues thus subsidizes many organizations that
need no subsidy, and fails to subsidize a great number of interests, likely
even within the business community itself that under the traditional theory of tax exemption are presumably deserving of subsidy.
Because the subsidy is not structured to only help those organizations that truly need the help, we should expect that it leads to an oversupply of business leagues and the goods and services they provide. As
the review of empirical literature shows, business leagues dominate the
interest group sector. Even if tax exemption only modestly enhances this
bias, it is unclear why we would want to enhance the bias at all. Additionally, because federal tax exemption is a signal good entitling certain
nonprofit organizations to additional rights and benefits, a removal of tax
exemption could have a greater impact beyond just the subsidy from tax
exemption.
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This Article also assessed three positive cases to be made for exemption for business leagues including that they enhance pluralism, that
they serve an important informational function, and that they serve to
regulate professions and industries for public benefit. The pluralism case
is dismissed on the basis of theoretical and empirical work demonstrating
that business interests already dominate the interest group domain. Because we have reason to believe the interest group sector is finite, we
have reason to believe the subsidy to business leagues may very well
crowd out other interests that have a harder time organizing. The information theory is also dismissed. Again, the evidence is that business interests will largely provide information to legislators in any case, and that
we have no reason to believe that nonprofit organizations will provide
more truthful information. If it could be shown that nonprofit organizations might provide more truthful information, the case for business
leagues as constructed might become stronger. Finally, the claim that
these organizations help to regulate the industry and should therefore be
exempted on that basis is dismissed for two reasons: (1) the exemption is
built to be much more inclusive than this narrow justification, and (2)
even where these organizations regulate, they regulate primarily as a
means to greater power as an interest group.
The best choice, therefore, is to end tax exemption for business
leagues. Legislators would need to take care to make it clear that business associations could not otherwise qualify under § 501(c)(4). On issues of disclosure of donors, it would be best to fight such battles outside
of the Code in order to reduce the amount of attention the IRS needs to
give to issues of politics. Finally, a second best solution would be to impose a net investment income tax on business leagues in order to lessen
the value of this ill-designed subsidy.

